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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that contemporary apologetic approaches correlate to, or derive their methods
from, different anthropological models with various degrees of accuracy, and that an
interdisciplinary study of humanity leads to proper conclusions for apologetic method. Three of
the most utilized contemporary apologetic methods are Traditional Apologetics,
Presuppositionalism, and Experiential/Narratival Apologetics. Each method reflects an
assumption of human persons as thinkers, believers, or desirers, respectively. Interdisciplinary
research from theology, sociology, psychology, economics, and neuroscience corroborates the
anthropological assumption of humans as essentially desirers. This research leads to at least
three important implications for apologetic method, including a focus on persuasion over
argumentation, creativity over rigidity, and community over individuality.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Why: Derek’s Story
My younger brother Derek and I were always close. While many siblings foster resentment
towards each other, our difficult lives only brought us closer over the years. After I left for
college to study ministry, I was astonished to find out that Derek denounced his faith, claiming it
as illogical, unsubstantiated, and misguided. He was appalled at the church and found Christians
to be irrational. After finding a home in science and atheism, he would frequently argue his
convictions with our mother since I was away. Although she is a strong Christian, she was
unconcerned with logical arguments in defending her faith. She just knew it to be true. She held a
“simple” faith.1 Unsurprisingly, especially given his personality and background, this was not
enough for him. Derek’s search for meaning and truth forbid an uncritical acceptance of such
beliefs. So, Derek and I began to dialogue.
Through shared contemplation of philosophical and theological topics, I presented
arguments for theism and subsequently Christianity. Derek called me his “sparring partner”;
which I became quite fond of. After over a year and a half of dialogue, as Derek and I sat on his
bedroom floor passing around a mini football, he finally conceded: not only is God real, but
Christianity makes the most sense. Immediately, my heart was filled with joy – at least until his

1

Although the term “simple” is often used derogatorily, it was included as that would likely be the intention of
Derek at the time. My firm belief is that one’s faith is not less for lack of logical arguments to defend it. I would
point to Alvin Plantinga’s view of God as a properly basic belief which upholds and reinforces this assertion. See
Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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next words: “But, I still do not want to be a Christian.” Shocked, I desperately tried to reconcile
his statements in my head. I had no idea what to do next.
So, I decided to share my testimony. The story of how my past trauma and depression led to
a suicide attempt. How as I stood there about to end my life, I whispered desperate last words
with tear-filled eyes: “God, if there is more to this life, please stop me.” In what was likely the
luckiest “coincidence” of my life, someone found me, and I was stopped. Although this
experience did not provide the panacea for all my issues, and even though the subsequent
journey was quite arduous, that day I gave my life to sharing the light that I had found and caring
for people in the midst of darkness. Instantly, Derek wept. Unfamiliar with the nuances of my
story, Derek was startled and saddened. Yet familiar with mental health and life struggles,
suddenly the abstract dialogue was thoroughly relevant and practical; his story made sense
within the grand story of Christianity. In the overwhelming haze that tends to follow a change of
heart, he pondered the future of his story: what is he to do now? After we prayed that day, and
after a seemingly endless amount of philosophy and theology discussions over the past few
years, Derek looks back on his past with curiosity. He can draw connections between his
unbelief and specific life factors, such as his lack of community and painful past. While his
journey, like mine, is still characteristically marked by intellectual curiosity and skepticism, his
testimony is worthy of reflection.
This thesis aims to make sense of Derek’s testimony, along with countless others, where
reason, evidences, and arguments were not enough when it came to conversion or even a sincere
exploration of Christianity – even for a person with the proclivities and personality such as his.
Diverse means led up to Derek’s change of heart: friendly dialogue with a trusted partner,
prolonged presence, narratives and testimonies, hope for a better future, appeals to emotions,
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coherency of a system, relevancy to life, and especially the drawing of God. Once Derek
conceded intellectual defeat, some would argue there was cause for celebration: not only were
his arguments destroyed, but he admitted Christianity is the most rational option – the faith has
been defended! For many apologists, this presentation of rational arguments and evidences for
the Christian faith is where apologetics begins and ends – as this encapsulates the defense of the
faith.2 However, perhaps apologetics is (or should be) more than this.
Over the years, I came to realize that I was shaped by a particular model that affected my
method for apologetics and my beliefs about Derek. I had a certain idea of the sort of creature
humans are and why they believe and act the way they do. This formed the way I defended the
faith and engaged with Derek. This correlation is exactly the type of question apologists should
pose about their method: what kind of person does this method presuppose, and what kind does it
nurture?3 It is likely many apologists fail to uncover the type of person their method assumes, if
not advances, and critically reflect on the consequences of such a person. This is to the detriment
of the faith and apologetics, I believe, as there is reason to be concerned about the prevailing
anthropological models in light of current research.4
James K.A. Smith describes three of the prevalent possibilities in theological and
philosophical anthropology.5 The first defines the human person as thinker. This is a “rationalist”

2

The next chapter’s discussion on traditional apologetic methodology explores this general approach and the
variation within it.
3

Richard Sennett poses this exact question about the psychological effects of capitalism on human persons. See
Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2011); quoted in Rowan Williams, Being Human: Bodies, Minds, Persons (Grand Rapids:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2018), 84.
4
5

This research is the topic of the third chapter.

James K.A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation (Grand Rapids: Baker
Books, 2009), 40–63, esp. 40–47.
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or “intellectualist” portrait with emphasis on cognitive faculties and an optimism towards reason,
often paired with functional disembodiment. The person-as-thinker model especially prevailed
throughout modernity, and currently is adapted by much of Protestant Christianity.6 The second
defines the human person as believer. As a critique to the former, the person-as-believer model
views humans primarily through their pre-rational beliefs, since thinking is dependent upon
one’s worldview, the “commitments and trusts that orient our being-in-the-world”; this model is
portrayed in Reformed Christianity.7 The third defines the human person as desirer or lover. This
model discounts the former two as reductionistic, and instead passes on a more holistic
anthropology developed from Augustine. In the person-as-desirer model, humans intend the
world through their unconscious desire and love; the telos of this desire orients their path in the
world and is affected primarily through bodily, narrative, affective, and relational ways. Smith
finds this model to be the most promising. Each of these models reflect the assumptions of a
different apologetic approach, as will be explored later.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the type of human person apologetic methodologies
presuppose to glean insight for apologetic method through comparison to current anthropological
research. Due to the size of such a task, the scope of this project will be limited in a few ways.
First, the apologetic approaches that are analyzed will be limited to frequently utilized
contemporary methods on the basis of relevance and focus. This will omit from consideration
apologetic approaches that are solely historic, hold too few adherents, lack a specific or

6

Protestant Christianity’s emphasis on ideas, abstract values, propositional knowledge and revelation, and an
“overly intellectualist” view of salvation are great examples of this. See David W. Bebbington, “Evangelical
Christianity and Modernism”, Crux 26, no. 2 (1990): 1–9; Alister McGrath, Narrative Apologetics: Sharing the
Relevance, Joy, and Wonder of the Christian Faith (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2019), 12–15; and Smith, Desiring
the Kingdom, 42.
7

Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 43–45.
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actionable method, or apologetic tools or mediums that are not an established system —
regardless of how insightful they may be. Second, the anthropological research covered will be
limited to theology, neuroscience, and the social sciences, specifically sociology, psychology,
and economics. This range allows for a diverse array of voices to comment on anthropological
issues and corroborate each other where applicable. Third, the final reflections derived from the
anthropological research will be limited to a few key insights that lack development in the
already analyzed methods. In other words, since an apologetic method that assumes an
“accurate” anthropology will have already been analyzed, the reflections on a properly informed
apologetic method will not reiterate all that was already said, but instead develop the approach
further from important research implications.

The How: Structure and Flow of the Argument
Chapter two begins with an exploration of various taxonomies of contemporary apologetic
approaches in order to better illustrate the current climate of apologetics. This results in around
fifteen apologetic approaches for consideration. After a brief examination of them all, the
approaches are limited according to the scope of the thesis above, resulting in four criteria for
further examination: (1) current utilization in contemporary settings; (2) inclusion of one or
many specific or actionable methodologies; (3) support from several notable proponents or
adherents, and (4) must be a standalone method or system, not a tool or medium. The remaining
approaches are further condensed into wider categories based on similar strategies or structures if
applicable. Each of these categories are then explored and examined through their methodology
and anthropological underpinnings. A summary of the methods’ anthropological models and
apologetic aims will conclude this chapter.

6

Chapter three explores the interdisciplinary anthropological research. The first section
examines theological anthropology through three main lenses: (1) the early Genesis narratives,
(2) Christology, and (3) Pauline literature. The second section contains research from the
sciences, including psychology, sociology, economics, and neuroscience. Finally, the conclusion
will summarize the main anthropological insights of the interdisciplinary research, compare the
results to Smith’s three models, and end with three significant implications for apologetic
method that were not already developed.
Chapter four translates the three apologetic implications from the previous chapter into three
dichotomies for apologetic reflection: persuasion over argumentation, creativity over rigidity,
and community over individuality. Each of these are unpacked and developed with the insight
derived from the anthropological research. The first section explores nine modes of persuasion
for the apologist to engage: (1) logos, persuasion by means of logic and coherency; (2) ethos,
persuasion by means of character and authority; (3) pathos, persuasion by means of emotions
and values; (4) kairos, persuasion by means of timing and appropriateness; (5) mythos,
persuasion by means of narrative and testimony; (6) topos, persuasion by means of theme and
relevance; (7) tropos, persuasion by means of way and manner; (8) typos, persuasion by means
of imitation and embodiment; and (9) theos, persuasion by means of the Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit. The second section on creativity discusses the plurality of ways to engage the apologetic
task. The third section emphasizes community and collaboration in apologetics. Finally, the
conclusion will consist of a summary of a properly informed apologetic methodology according
to the former research and reflections.

CHAPTER TWO
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO APOLOGETIC METHOD

Introduction
Apologetics is like a beautifully aged tree. Ancient sundry roots blossom into majestic scenery,
producing various colors, patterns, and fruit, transforming with the season. Over the centuries,
apologists – with variegated foci and presuppositions – produced a range of colorful and fruitful
approaches. Although, when the seasons change, some methods and approaches become vacuous
and arid, irrelevant and obsolete. While God remains constant, apologetic methodology
constantly requires pruning; the dying branches must be cut-off for new growth.1 For continual
life and beauty, the tree – like apologetics – must be reshaped and guided to continue in the new
seasons or tough terrain. When the cultural climate changes, such as in the Enlightenment of the
18th Century, so, too, must the apologists and their methods change for influence and survival;
lack of adaptability and progression stymies growth.2 Although the historic roots of apologetics
and their foci perpetually recede and revive, the apologist’s challenge is to defend the faith in
their context.3 As the apologist abides in God, and God abides in the apologist, he/she will bear

1

Braxton Hunter, Evangelistic Apologetics: Compatibility and Integration (Evansville: Trinity Academic Press,
2014), 100.
2

As Christianity was devastated by the attacks of the Enlightenment, several apologists — with very different
approaches — responded to the call. See John Warwick Montgomery, “A Short History of Apologetics,” in
Christian Apologetics: An Anthology of Primary Sources, eds. Khaldoun A. Sweis and Chad V. Meister (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 2012), 24–25.
3

In tracing the history and development of apologetics, this oscillation is made evident. Aristotelian proofs and
literary apologetics from the medieval period, for example, still influence many apologists today. Conversely, many
early apologetic emphases, such as miracles, are not as influential today. Apologetic methods ebb and flow in usage
over the epochs. For a succinct history of apologetics, see Montgomery, “A Short History of Apologetics,” 21–28.

7
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fruit (cf. Jn. 15:5-6); similarly, the vitality of apologetic methodology also depends on this
mutual remaining. Thus, apologetics is simultaneously person-centered and God-centered. The
question remains: how, then, may the faith be defended today?
The spectrum of contemporary approaches offers a wide array of answers. Before
proposing a new or revised approach towards apologetics, an analysis and selection of the
prevalent contemporary apologetic methodologies is required. Identifying and assessing an
extensive list of apologetic methods and approaches is quite the daunting, if not impossible, task.
Why even are there so many different apologetic methods? If defense of the faith is a biblical
command, why do not all apologists simply follow the scriptural example? Despite reading the
same text, many intelligent and faithful Christians end up with different conclusions. As will be
explored later, this is likely due to their beliefs about humanity. These anthropological
assumptions inevitably affect their methodology and aims; thus, the selected apologetic methods
will be analyzed along these lines. The rest of this chapter aims to explore the spectrum of
contemporary approaches to apologetic methodology and further examine the selected methods’
anthropological foundations.

The Extremes & the Middle Path(s): A Spectrum of Views
This section will survey various apologetic methods and categorizations to determine which
views will be selected for further in-depth analysis. Since many contemporary apologetic method
taxonomies have been offered in recent history, they will be compared alongside each other to
present a more complete picture of the current apologetic climate. Perspectives with similar
strategies and structures will appropriately be combined into wider categories, and some will be
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designated for further examination based on their contemporary relevance and viability as a
distinct system and methodology.
Brian Morley undertook a similar objective to classify and categorize apologetic
methods, and created a beneficial, yet incomplete, chart of apologetic approaches.4 The
following page contains a condensed visual graphic of this spectrum with a brief summary of
each perspective (fig 1). Although these views will be elaborated on later, they provide a
sufficient overview for now. The location of each perspective on the spectrum is crucial to
understanding each view. They are organized by increasing emphasis on objective,
independently existing evidence. Two extremes enclose the spectrum: fideism and rationalism.
On one extreme, faith is independent of reason, while on the other, faith is completely supported
by reason. Presuppositionalism assumes God, as there can be no direct independently existing
proof; so, the system resides next to fideism – even if their claims of absolute certainty mirror the
other side of the spectrum. Reformed Epistemology holds that faith is a properly basic belief, a
type of direct knowing; although some rational arguments may be employed, none of them are
warranted grounds for belief in God. Experientialism and Pragmatism each offer one
independent ground for justified belief – i.e. experience and workability, respectively – hence
their placement above the others. While experience tends to be more subjective, workability is
more objective. Veridicalism accepts intuitive givens (like the prior views) and verification
through evidence or reason (like the ensuing views).

4

Brian K. Morley, Mapping Apologetics: Comparing Contemporary Approaches (Downers Grove: InterVarsity
Press, 2015), 13–26.

10

Figure 1. Infographic adapting Brian Morley's Spectrum of Apologetic Views.
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As the chart moves on, there is less an emphasis on intuitions and more an emphasis on
objective evidence. Combinationalism’s three tests for truth – rational, empirical, and existential
– provides more criteria for the proof of Christianity than the previous perspectives.5 Classical
Apologetics embraces various arguments and evidences for theism and Christianity. However, in
this system, “worldview determines the interpretation of facts.”6 In contrast, Evidentialism
claims that the facts and evidence they provide suggests the correct interpretation — regardless
of worldview. The boundaries of fideism and rationalism orient the majority of systematic
apologetic methodologies, at least according to Morley.
Steven B. Cowan’s Five Views on Apologetics is perhaps the categorization schema du jour
of apologetic perspectives. The work offers five familiar views on apologetic method from wellknown advocates: Classical, Evidential, Presuppositional, Reformed Epistemology, and
Cumulative Case.7 These five comprise the extremes, or outer boundaries, of Morley’s
spectrum.8 Regardless of recent developments in apologetic methodology, often this framework
comprises the only approaches that are offered to students or those who wish to defend their
faith. Any approach via media is often neglected or trivialized. Based on popularity and utility,
however, these methods cover the vast majority of apologetics practiced today, at least in the

5

Clarification may be needed here: There seems to be two types of understandings when it comes to
Combinationalism as an apologetic methodology. Morley’s understanding is that of approaches by apologists such
as E.J. Carnell, Gordon Lewis, or Francis Schaeffer, as explored above. The term is also occasionally used as any
approach that combines different apologetic methodologies, but this should not be confused with Morley’s
categorization. For an example of the former, see Edward John Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics
(William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1948).
6

Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 24.

7

Steven B. Cowan, Five Views on Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 2000).

8

Although Cumulative Case is not listed on Morley’s spectrum, it shares similarities with Classical and Evidential
apologetic approaches as previously mentioned. So, it would be located near that extreme on his spectrum.
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Western world. Yet, this taxonomy remains incomplete — even the proponents within the work
criticize the editors’ selected methods.9
For comparison, Joshua Chatraw and Mark Allen provide another categorization schema for
apologetic methodologies. The methods can be broken up into four quadrants, each with a hard
and soft variant. According to them, the main apologetic methodologies can be explained by
these four: (1) Classical Apologetics, (2) Evidential Apologetics, (3) Presuppositional
Apologetics, and (4) Experiential/Narratival Apologetics (E/N).10 The leftmost quadrants, i.e.
classical and evidential apologetics, are characterized by optimism towards reason apart from
special revelation — and vice versa. Furthermore, they include Reformed Epistemology and
Cumulative Case as separate prominent approaches, solely because they are not as defined in
method as the others.11 Hard variants are rigid in their methodologies, whereas soft variants are
more eclectic and see other approaches as cogent and valid.12 This distinction greatly clarifies
many of the inner tensions of each system. While most of the approaches are familiar thus far,
E/N offers another unique perspective.13 This approach emphasizes the particular framework that
a person is in, which grounds their evidence and reasoning, and is suspicious against human’s
reasoning capabilities — similar to presuppositionalists.14 However, E/N apologists — unlike

9

For example, William Lane Craig humorously suggests the surprise of the editors in realizing their views are not so
different after all! See William Lane Craig, “A Classical Apologist’s Response” in Five Views on Apologetics, 122.
10

Josh Chatraw and Mark D. Allen, Apologetics at the Cross: An Introduction for Christian Witness (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan Academic: 2018), 145.
11

Chatraw and Allen, 145.

12

Chatraw and Allen.
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An E/N approach differs slightly from experientialism on Morley’s spectrum. Pure experientialism is more of an
extreme version of E/N and doesn’t include a narratival focus. While E/N is commonly practiced today and has
gained a fair share of proponents, pure experientialism is rare. However, it would likely be located at a similar place
on the spectrum.
14

Chatraw and Allen, Apologetics at the Cross, 162–163.
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presuppositionalists — invite the nonbeliever into a story and experience.15 There are no proofs
or rationalistic arguments. Rather, the nonbeliever is asked to try an experience and a grand
narrative is illuminated. Depending on one’s definition of apologetics, one may or may not even
consider an E/N approach as apologetics at all!16 Even though E/N has grown in recent years,
especially as a response to postmodernism, the specific methods offered are usually marked by
diversity, so a sustained and cohesive study of this approach remains to be seen.17
However, an important distinction should be made regarding E/N methods and the use of
narrative or testimony in apologetics. Narrative is a type of communication or delivery method
that diverse people utilize. For example, Braxton Hunter’s fiction novel argues for the existence
of God through classical apologetic arguments and methodology.18 More well-known authors,
such as Fyodor Dostoyevsky or C.S. Lewis, tackle apologetic issues through storied medium as
well. Stories, C.S. Lewis contemplated, “can mediate imaginative life to the masses while not
being contemptible to the few.”19 A narrative approach is supplemental to other apologetic
approaches, but is not necessarily a distinct system.20 Similarly, the use of testimony in
apologetics is less of a system and more of a medium or supplement, as it is commonly
recognized as an apologetic tool by various apologetic methods.21 For example, Nabeel Qureshi,

15

Chatraw and Allen.

16

For example, John Warwick Montgomery refers to these apologists as “non-apologetic apologists.” See
Montgomery, “A Short History of Apologetics,” 28.
17

Benno van den Toren, Christian Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 4–5.

18

Braxton Hunter, The Chronicles of Adonai: The Colony (San Antonia: Trinity Academic Press, 2016).

19

C.S. Lewis, “On Stories” in Of Other Worlds: Essays and Stories (New York: Harper Collins, 2017), 18.

20

McGrath, Narrative Apologetics, 8.

21

See, for example, Norman Geisler and Patrick Zukeran, The Apologetics of Jesus: A Caring Approach to Dealing
with Doubters (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2009).
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an ex-Muslim, practices apologetics through the sharing of his journey of becoming Christian.22
Nevertheless, in his story and testimony resides other arguments for the faith. Most apologetic
approaches incorporate the use of narrative or testimony among other, more prominent, tools.
Thus, narrative and testimony as supplemental tools are distinct from an E/N methodology.
Certainly, there is no shortage of apologetic approaches. They are as diverse as fruit, each
providing their own texture, flavor, and color. However, the list must be narrowed down to allow
for proper examination. Thus, specific criteria must be met for inclusion. For the approach to be
further analyzed, it must
(a) be currently utilized in contemporary settings,
(b) include one or many specific or actionable methodologies,
(c) hold several notable proponents or adherents,
and

(d) be an established system (and not a tool or medium).23

All the aforementioned apologetic approaches will be filtered through these criteria. To begin,
rationalism will be excluded based on (a) and (c). Although some adapted models remain
infrequently, rationalism tout court is rare. Morley disregards both pure experientialism and
pragmatism for his own consideration since there are very few notable works and adherents
supporting or outlining the claims, and thus, these will be excluded on account of (c).24
Verificationalism, a category that includes veridicalism and combinationalism, is often
characterized as a mixture of presuppositionalist and traditional apologetic methodologies, and
while it does offer some unique contributions and perspectives, it will be not be included due to

22

Nabeel Qureshi, Seeking Allah, Finding Jesus: A Devout Muslim Encounters Christianity (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2016), 17–18.
23

These limitations were developed and explained in the first chapter.

24

Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 20.
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(c).25 Due to the nature of Verificationalism, however, much of the following research will
directly apply to these views. Narrative and Testimonial Apologetics will not be included on
basis of (d) since they are simply tools or mediums for persuasion across various approaches —
they are not standalone systems. The use of narrative and testimony, though, will be substantially
discussed in the following sections.
Fideism may be harder to categorize.26 Most apologists view fideism as a denial of
apologetics. If apologetics is defense of the faith through reason alone, then, evidently, this
would be true. However, this is not to say that their method may not defend the faith — perhaps
just not defend it well or in the same way. The idea of faith as a blind leap is appealing to some.
How one defines “defense” will nonetheless influence their view of fideism. Whether technically
apologetics or not, many claim it as at least biblically inadequate.27 Even Jesus, for example,
offers arguments or grounds for belief (cf. Ac. 1:3; 17:31; Lk. 24:27). Fideistic apologetic
approaches are rare, and commonly claimed proponents — such as Blaise Pascal or Tertullian —
are usually misidentified as fideists.28 Thus, fideism will not be included on account of a mixture
of (a), (b), and (c); even if some are debatable.
Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology, similarly, is an interesting case. Although it
fulfills the criteria for (a), (c), and (d), the question of methodology complicates the matter. His

25

James Bielby, “Varieties of Apologetics,” in Christian Apologetics: An Anthology of Christian Sources, 37.

26

The history of the term “fideism” is marked by controversy on its meaning. This label is hardly self-applied and
functions similarly to the term “relativism” where the purpose is often not for clarity but for abuse. See Richard
Amesbury, “Fideism”, The Stanford Handbook of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalt.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/fideism/.
27
28

Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 25–26.

See, for example, Norman Geisler and Paul Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic: 1987), 262.
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perspective should be explored: How do we know that other people have minds, that they are not
just elaborate robots? How do we know that the universe was not created five minutes ago with
fabricated memories and the look of old age? There is no elaborate argument or evidence for it, it
is something one simply believes; this is a basic belief, i.e. that which can be justifiably held
without the need to appeal for arguments or proofs.29 Plantinga argues that belief in God can be
properly basic. In other words, belief in God is warranted and justified whether or not one has or
accepts evidence for it. Warrant is an important concept for Plantinga, as it is what distinguishes
between knowledge and true belief. In order for something to have warrant, the belief must be
produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, in a cognitive environment appropriate for
the faculties, and with a design that is successfully aimed towards truth (whether that be God or
even guided evolution).30
Plantinga creates two models for this known as the A/C and Extended A/C model.31 The
A/C model focuses on John Calvin’s idea of the sensus divinitas, i.e. humans natural knowledge
of God or sense of the divine, and Thomas Aquinas’ view of knowledge of God as implanted by
nature. Although Plantinga disagrees with the implantation concept, he recognizes the sensus
divinitas as a sort of cognitive faculty that produces these beliefs about God.32 This process
meets all of Plantinga’s requirements for warrant, as stated previously, but is still affected by the
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fall and sin. For this reason, he develops his Extended A/C model, where he explains specific
Christian theological beliefs with the elements of Scripture, the Holy Spirit, and faith.33
Plantinga’s insights offered a radically different approach to apologetics. Reformed
Epistemology differs from methods that focus on rational argumentation or evidence for belief.34
For Plantinga, these are not needed for justified belief. Although he sees faith as a properly basic
belief, Plantinga nonetheless highlights the importance of both positive apologetics, i.e.
supporting beliefs with arguments for the Christian God, and negative apologetics, i.e.
responding to critiques against Christianity.35 In fact, he even goes on to offer his own
arguments, such as his famous free will defense.36 Regardless, Reformed Epistemology
emphasizes how a person can be justified in their faith without the need for supporting
evidence.37 Although it is technically an apologetic approach because it shows that Christian
belief can be warranted, it excludes a specific practical methodology. As the name denotes, it is
rather an epistemology. Thus, it will be excluded on account of (b).
The remaining apologetic approaches can be condensed into wider categories since their
strategies and structures are related. For example, while there are different types of
Presuppositionalism — such as the unique approaches from Cornelius Van Til, John Frame, and
Gordon Clark — the general approach is shared.38 Thus, these approaches will be combined for
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use of analysis and critique. Any instances where the individual intricacies or nuances matter for
the critique will be highlighted. The categorizations include three views: Presuppositionalism,
containing all of the approaches that argue from God as a presupposition; Traditional
Apologetics, including Evidentialism, Classical Apologetics, Cumulative Case, and similar views
that argue to God; and Experiential/Narratival Apologetics, including the various proponents that
form this elusive category. Now that the disparate views have been explored and selected, the
remaining apologetic approaches will be summarized and subsequently examined by how their
anthropological understandings affect their methodology.

Presuppositionalism
Nearing the top of Morley’s spectrum, presuppositionalism resides among views with a
decreased emphasis on objective, independently existing evidence. Cornelius Van Til, Gordon
Clark, and John Frame comprise some of the most cited and influential presuppositionalists.
Their commitments to Calvinism prompt their methodology; so, a Reformed view of God and
Scripture is usually necessary for their approach.39 Each provide his own nuances and
differences, but often agree on essential concepts — summarized by adherence to belief in the
triune God as a necessary presupposition.40
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“A truly Protestant apologetic,” Cornelius Van Til insists, “must make it’s beginning from
the presupposition that the triune God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, speaks to him with absolute
authority in Scripture.”41 For adherents of this view, Christianity is a presupposition that cannot
be done without. Since humankind is fallen and suffers the noetic effects of sin — i.e. the effects
of sin on the mind which governs interpretation — all unbelievers presuppose their own
autonomy and are biased against God.42 Unbelief is a matter of rebellion, not ignorance. The
unbeliever actively suppresses their knowledge of God; they resist dependence on God.43 Every
person interprets facts from their own worldview and presuppositions. Thus, there is not enough
common ground for believers and unbelievers to reason on.
The extent of this common ground is debated among presuppositionalists.44 Van Til holds
that the only common ground is that they live in the same universe run by the same God — their
metaphysical situation, so to speak — but there are no common notions or beliefs to be
interacted with. Since all facts are interpreted by a worldview, believers and unbelievers
necessarily have no overlap in epistemological grounds, even if psychologically there is apparent
or “formal” overlap in beliefs. The truth nonbelievers know is considered “borrowed capital,” as
it only makes sense within Christianity as the presupposition. John Frame disagrees. For him,
knowledge is not all or nothing like Van Til argues: believers and unbelievers can truly
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communicate and hold overlap in beliefs, otherwise nonbelievers would have an excuse for
ignorance, and not have access to rational discussion or persuasion
For stricter presuppositionalists like Van Til, traditional apologetics is abhorrent, then, since
theistic arguments and evidences make humans the arbiters of truth rather than God, and any
additional knowledge of God would be met with rebellion and the suppression of the truth.45
Rather than appealing to “common notions” of the unbeliever and believer, apologists should
appeal to the only common ground: their (suppressed) knowledge of God and their metaphysical
situation.46 In this way, apologetics reflects confirmation bias more than an objective search for
truth. Facts are not being objectively analyzed; one’s worldview and commitments interprets
facts a certain way.
Presuppositionalist methodology confronts the unbeliever with a reductio ad absurdum, i.e.
an argument that leads a position to its logically absurd conclusion.47 God is a precondition for
knowledge, thus, denial of God is absurd. Attempts to persuade through neutral reason are
misguided. Evidently, nonbelievers can and do use logic and reason, but their worldview cannot
account for what they are doing; there is an inconsistency in their utilization of logic and reason
with their presuppositions.48 As Van Til succinctly asserts, “unless you believe in God you can
logically believe in nothing else.”49 This is an indirect proof for God: although God cannot be
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directly proven, belief in God is necessary for experience and thought.50 All reasoning is circular
reasoning — the premises, the methods, and the conclusions are inevitably intertwined.51
Believers presuppose truth, and hence, their conclusions are true. For Van Til, this approach will
necessarily offend since nonbelievers should be confronted on their rebellion and self-idolatry.52
Van Til and Frame exemplify the difference between hard presuppositionalism and a soft
presuppositionalism. Hard presuppositionalists reject all use of direct proof and arguments,
whereas soft presuppositionalists see no difference in direct or indirect proof, thus allowing for
classical and evidentialist arguments.53 Frame allows for traditional apologetic reasoning, but
only when aimed at transcendental goals: “God is the condition of all meaning… but that
conclusion cannot be reached in a single, simple syllogism. A transcendental argument normally,
perhaps always, requires many subarguments, and some of these may be traditional proofs or
Christian evidences.”54 The ostensible similarities in dialogue and method between soft
presuppositionalists and traditional apologists, then, appear indistinguishable. Hence, Frame
suggests a “presuppositionalism of the heart” — the attitude of a person who understands God as
the sovereign source of all rationality and meaning, that all people are biased, and that
nonbelievers rebel against God. This attitude is expressed in dialogue with the nonbeliever —
through diction, tone, and personal piety — and by allying with all apologists who posture
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similarly, regardless of affiliation.55 Instead of a preoccupation with apologetic methodology, as
Van Til is often criticized of, Frame’s approach promotes developing arguments to address
nonbelievers and thus fulfill the Great Commission.56
Presuppositionalist anthropology is found primarily through their reading of Scripture.
Unsurprisingly, this begins in the creation narrative. Humanity was created in the image of God
(cf. Gen 1:27), but this is true in two senses: (1) in a wider view, humans reflect God’s image as
they are personalities, i.e. they are like God in any way that creatures can be like God; and (2) in
a narrower view, in which humanity was created with true knowledge, righteousness, and
holiness.57 Christ comes to restore in humans the true knowledge, righteousness, and holiness.58
Paul testifies of the new self that is “created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness”
and is “being renewed in knowledge in the image of its Creator” (cf. Col. 3:10; Eph. 4:24).
Certainly, God’s knowledge exceeds that of his creation, but before the fall humans fully
understood the revelation of God promensura humana, i.e. within human’s finite capacity.59
Humanity was created to relate to the universe in three ways: interpreting the world as a Prophet,
dedicating the world to God as a Priest, and ruling over the world as King.60 The fall of humanity
represents the desire to be independent of God; this autonomy confused finitude with sin and
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perpetuates the idolatry of the self.61 Paul’s explanation of humanity’s condition in Romans 1:1822 (NRSV) reflects this autonomy:
For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness
of those who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For what can be known about
God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the
world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been
understood and seen through the things he has made. So they are without excuse; for
though they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they
became futile in their thinking, and their senseless minds were darkened. Claiming to
be wise, they became fools; and they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for
images resembling a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles.62
Although God and his divine attributes are tacitly believed, the gospel remains misunderstood
and obscure (cf. Rom. 10:14-15).63 Salvation, as would be consistent with Reformed theology, is
not dependent on persons, but on God alone; the gospel is not to be accepted or rejected as they
please.64 Regardless of the pluralistic state of the world, there are really only two religions
humans have to decide upon.65 As Paul explores, there is only the wisdom of God and the
wisdom of the world (cf. 1 Cor. 1:18-2:16). Furthermore, due to humanity’s self-bondage and
rebellion, God must empower unbelievers to accept salvation (Rom. 9:14-23; Eph. 2:8).66
Presuppositionalists’ view of humanity and Scripture (in)directly correlate to their method.
Since the fall of humanity affects their cognitive faculties and influences their desire for
autonomy, people are in a state of rebellion against God. The depth of this rebellion is so
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immense that they subdue the truth they already hold; they do not need to be confronted with
traditional proofs and arguments for the faith — they already believe! The only way to confront
the unbeliever is by their presuppositions. The dissonance within the nonbeliever’s own belief
system points to the necessity of God. To deny recognition of God as the necessary
presupposition to all thought is to head for nihilism or a less consistent worldview living off of
borrowed capital.67 While the defense of the faith is made through the transcendental argument,
salvation is solely a gift from God. Whether or not the sinner accepts the Christian worldview is
a matter of the grace of God.68
A few assumptions appear to inundate presuppositionalist approaches. First, the primary
goal of presuppositionalist apologetics is to demonstrate that Christian belief is true.69 This is
evinced through the transcendental argument. Defending the faith, then, means that the Christian
worldview be shown as necessary and true. Of course, salvation comes solely from God, thus,
conversion does not come from presenting the Christian worldview as true. Rather,
presuppositionalist apologetics merely indicates the truth of the worldview. Second, humans are
seen primarily as believing creatures. Humans (as believers) are defined by their beliefs,
allegiances, and commitments that orient their life. Before any ideas or thoughts, beliefs are
already assumed — people’s worldviews are pre-rational.70 Humans do not simply need a slight
adjustment to their ideas or thoughts — they need a radical subversion of their whole belief
system and worldview.
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Traditional Apologetics
Nearing the bottom of Morley’s spectrum, traditional apologetics resides among views with an
increased emphasis on objective, independently existing evidence. A variety of Christian
thinkers comprise this field, including William Lane Craig, Norman Geisler, J.P. Moreland, Gary
Habermas, Michael Licona, John Warwick Montgomery, Paul Feinberg, and C.S. Lewis. These
methods, contrary to presuppositionalism, argue to God as the conclusion.71 All of these
proponents would utilize several arguments for the existence of the Christian God — whether by
theistic arguments, historical evidences, religious experiences, or a combination of them —
although it is accomplished in different ways. Classical and evidential approaches offer
standalone arguments as proof of the Christian God, whereas a cumulative case approach
defends the Christian God through a collection of interdependent evidences and arguments.72
Classical apologetics tends to follow a succinct method: prove theism, then Christianity.73
The approach is a two-step process. The classical apologist begins with the common ground —
i.e. shared beliefs — between believers and nonbelievers.74 If the nonbeliever interacts with
science, philosophy, and history, then what better place for the apologist to ground their
arguments? A nonbeliever likely embraces sense perception, self evidence, and common modes
of reasoning.75 Thus, common ground comprises of shared beliefs and methodologies, such as
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deduction, induction, Bayes’ theorem, possible world semantics, and understandings of the law
of contradiction, necessity, and contingency.76 The classical apologist appeals to widely accepted
facts, common sense, unbiased (or anti-Christian) expert testimony, and propounds a cumulative
case of arguments.77 William Lane Craig also briefly suggests that arational conditions, such as
courteousness or genuine concern, may affect persuasiveness and that the ultimate apologetic is
one’s life, i.e. their relationship with God and others.78
Craig distinguishes between knowing the faith to be true, and showing the faith to be true.79
A Christian knows their beliefs to be true because they are properly basic based on the internal
testimony of the Holy Spirit, even though rational arguments may confirm the faith.80 However,
evidences and arguments demonstrate that the Christian worldview is the most plausible option
by showing the faith to be true.81 The apologetic task, then, is showing the faith to be true by the
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two-step approach. The step order (usually) matters for classical apologists. However, this issue
would be what separates hard classical apologists from soft classical apologists.82
Hard classical apologists, such as Norman Geisler, assert that proving theism first is
necessary; without this first step, historical arguments hold no meaning since they are understood
through an atheistic worldview.83 The theistic worldview is what makes the resurrection a
relevant and significant event. Soft classical apologists, such as William Lane Craig, believe
there may be cases where historical evidences may lead to direct belief in the Christian God; so
while it is not a necessary order, he believes the classical approach as being more effective.84 In
fact, soft classical apologists and soft evidential apologists — who allow or utilize theistic
arguments — become hard to distinguish. Craig suggests that rather than being separate
methodologies, they are “merely a personally preferred style of argumentation.”85
Classical apologists utilize a variety of arguments to prove theism. Norman Geisler and
Frank Turek offer four popular evidences for theism: (1) the beginning of the universe, via the
cosmological argument; (2) the design of the universe, via the teleological argument and
anthropic principle; (3) the design of life, via the teleological argument; and (4) moral law, via
the moral argument.86 A few classical apologists also utilize an adapted version of the
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controversial ontological argument.87 Although the ontological argument has revived in recent
history, many apologists, such as Geisler, find it problematic, however fascinating.88 These
arguments are the most prevalent theistic proofs for classical apologists, albeit each apologist
explains and nuances the arguments in different ways.
The subsequent strategy argues, alongside evidential apologetics, specifically for the
Christian God. Most often, this is done through a defense of the resurrection of Jesus, the
identity of Jesus, and the historical reliability of the New Testament.89 One common approach is
the use of abductive logic, which analyzes the available evidence, and then infers the best
explanation of the evidence.90 The widely accepted facts surrounding the resurrection — such as
the empty tomb found by women, the appearances of a living Jesus to various groups and
individuals, and the first disciples belief in Jesus without historical Judaic or pagan influences —
infer that God raised Jesus from the dead.91 Craig concludes,
“If these three facts are historically established with a reasonable degree of certainty
(and it seems to me that they can, as they are recognized by the majority of New
testament critics today) and if alternative naturalistic explanations for these facts are
untenable (and the consensus of scholarship is that they are), then unless the
resurrection hypothesis is shown to be even more untenable than its failed competitors
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(and my experience in debating the comparative merits of the hypotheses convince me
that it is not)… [the preferred explanation is that] God raised Jesus from the dead.”92
Geisler and Turek provide a slightly different approach. After proving theism, they argue for the
historical reliability of the New Testament first, and then for miraculous confirmations of Jesus’
claims to be God.93 This approach greatly overlaps with evidentialism.
Evidential apologists, in contrast to classical apologists, argue for a one-step approach: they
attempt to prove the Christian God. Unsurprisingly, then, their method is ostensibly the same as
the classical apologists’ second step. Granted, evidentialists contribute their own unique
perspectives. Gary Habermas, for example, slightly changes the oft used minimal facts approach.
The traditional minimal facts approach argues first through the reliability of the New Testament,
and subsequently to supernatural beliefs, e.g. Jesus’ deity, the resurrection, and inspiration of
Scripture.94 This can be reflected in Geisler and Turek’s view above. The problem with this
traditional approach, according to Habermas, is that “it would be difficult to argue from general
trustworthiness of the Bible in a way that makes its supernatural claims credible while showing
that those of other ancient authors are not.”95 So, instead, he argues from five widely-accepted
facts surrounding the resurrection, and assesses them with five principles historians use to
validate ancient documents.96 This approach proves Jesus’ resurrection is the most probable and
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reasonable explanation of the historical evidence.97 Certainly, the classical apologist may utilize
Habermas’ approach as well.
To the evidentialist, not only can humans approach facts objectively, but facts point to their
interpretation.98 While nonbelievers may resist facts in sinful autonomy, that does not equate to
facts being unconvincing or unable to overcome self-interest.99 As previously mentioned,
classical apologists, in contrast, believe that facts have no interpretation or meaning outside of a
worldview. The classical approach shares more in common with presuppositionalism since a
correct framework for reasoning is necessary. Contrarily, the evidentialist asserts a one-step
approach because people can analyze the facts and come to the most probable conclusion without
needing a specific worldview. The historical facts and evidence points to the truth itself. Hard
evidentialists, although rare, would resist all classical theistic arguments; soft evidentialists such
as Gary Habermas, on the other hand, allow or utilize theistic arguments but view them as
unnecessary.100
Gary Feinberg develops the most commonly cited cumulative case apologetic method.
According to both Feinberg and Habermas, this cumulative case approach can be seen as a
progeny or modification of (soft) evidentialism, and they predominantly agree on the following:
the one-step approach, the correspondence of facts to their interpretation (even without a neutral
standpoint), the reliability of historical evidences, and multiple means of apologetic defense.101
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Additionally, Feinberg incorporates other human experiences, such as “contingency and
orderliness; the experience of God’s presence and a relationship with him, which many claim to
have had; the existence of a moral law; a revelation that claims to come from God; and
prophecies that are contained in this revelation that are fulfilled.”102 He proposes seven prevalent
tests for truth that resolve conflicting truth claims: the tests of consistency, correspondence,
comprehensiveness, simplicity, livability, fruitfulness, and conservation.103 Given these tests for
truth, Feinberg concludes that the Christian worldview offers the best explanation given all the
evidence. The uniqueness of this perspective is that rather than offer several independent
arguments for the faith, the strength of the argument is found in the mosaic, or interdependent
connectivity, of the various arguments.104 The burden of proof does not rely on independent
arguments, but the combination of them.
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historical evidences. For this reason, Habermas’ understanding is chosen and preferred. For Beilby’s argument and
taxonomy, see Bielby, “Varieties of Apologetics, 32–38.
102

Paul Feinberg, “A Cumulative Case Apologist’s Response,” in Five Views of Apologetics, 131.

103

Paul Feinberg, “Cumulative Case Apologetics,” in Five Views of Apologetics, 153–158.

104

The mosaic metaphor appropriately portrays the differentiation. While some apologists may offer a single
argument, or piece, pointing to the truth of Christianity, a cumulative case approach offers the larger picture or
mosaic that is created from all the pieces together. Although, for cumulative case apologists, each particular piece
does not need to offer complete proof — the argument is in the picture or mosaic as a whole. Other traditional
apologists critique this conclusion via the leaky buckets metaphor, i.e. if one leaky bucket cannot hold water, neither
can ten. For more on religious experience as piece of the mosaic, see Douglas Groothius, Christian Apologetics: A
Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2011), 379; quoted in Braxton Hunter,
Evangelistic Apologetics, 62. For Norman Geisler’s critique, see Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 129–130. For
Feinberg’s defense, see Feinberg, “Cumulative Case Apologetics,” in Five Views of Apologetics, 167.

32

All three of these methods utilize both positive and negative apologetics.105 Positive
apologetics offers reasons and arguments for the faith; all of the aforementioned arguments used
by traditional apologists represent this. Negative apologetics seeks to defend the faith through
answering objections raised against it; perhaps the biggest objection to the faith is the problem of
evil, so an apologetic response would fall in this category.106 Of course, oftentimes arguments
may serve a dual-function for both purposes.107 Norman Geisler’s rigorous work, Christian
Apologetics, exemplifies the interaction of these two. He systematically critiques various tests of
truth and worldviews, and offers his own arguments for the Christian faith, while refuting all
raised objections in the process.108
Traditional apologetics is more akin to a legal case than a friendly conversation. Craig
mentions that his approach may be “polarizing and combative,” yet this is necessary because
“you’re not arguing against another person; you’re arguing against his case.”109 When
apologetics equates to demonstrating the rationality of the Christian faith to rational creatures,
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the approach is “by nature de-personalizing.”110 This de-personalization is perhaps why soft
traditional apologists resist a more rigid approach and, rather, include other methods
sporadically, like narrative apologetics, in order to impact more people. Cumulative Case
apologists, for example, add religious and human experiences to the persuasion among logical or
historical evidences, in order to present every possible fact for the unbeliever.111 Montgomery
also identifies a growing number of “tender-minded” people who see life in more subjective or
existential terms, so, he suggests a literary apologetic method in lieu of objective
argumentation.112 He concludes stories are effective because they are relevant to life, answering
the main needs of humanity: an integrated personality, genuine fellowship, and purpose.113 For
him, this alternative approach may be necessary because many will simply deny even the most
obvious conclusion of evidences. Similarly, Craig supplements his positive apologetic work,
Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, with a brief addendum claiming that the
ultimate apologetic is one’s life, i.e. relationship with God and others.114 Christians’ love
inevitably draws people to Christ. When engaged in apologetic dialogue, especially, there are
existential considerations that make an argument persuasive. Craig, for this reason, alludes to
arational factors (as previously mentioned) and encourages presenting arguments alongside the
gospel and a personal testimony.115
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The main concerns of traditional apologetic anthropology are the human condition (and
solution), human knowledge, and the nature of human beings. Although the exact
anthropological understandings slightly differ among the various proponents of traditional
apologetics, there is enough overlap to present a unique and cohesive view — especially separate
from presuppositionalism and experiential/narratival apologetics. For traditional apologists,
humans are essentially rational beings, reflecting the nature of God.116 The imago dei endowed
humans with reason, moral action, and self-determination, among other debatable qualities.117
This requires human beings to possess some form of free will, power, and knowledge.118
Cartesian dualism and the possibility of disembodiment are usually held by traditional
apologists.119 This is unsurprising, given the lingering influence of rationalism on traditional
apologetics.120
The role of reason in apologetics is nuanced within their view of the human condition and
human knowledge. Without the help of the Spirit, humans would never become followers of
Christ: people, left to themselves, do not seek God (Rom 3:10-11); they cannot understand
spiritual things (1 Cor. 2:14); and they are antagonistic towards God (Rom 8:7).121 The Spirit
constantly draws the nonbeliever, continually convicting him/her so all people know the truth of
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God’s existence and their position before him (John 16:7-11).122 Arguments and evidences for
the Christian God will never “reason” people into the faith.123 Thus, if a person refuses to come
to Christ, it is not simply because of a deficiency in knowledge, but a suppression or ignoring of
the Spirit’s drawing; evidence and arguments cannot transform a hostile and closed heart.124 As
Geisler and Turek frame it, there is “a difference between proving a proposition and accepting a
proposition.”125 There is freedom to accept or reject the faith. There is enough evidence to
convince, but God leaves ambiguity to not compel those unwilling.126 Regardless, people can
help draw others to God. Even if the Spirit alone converts, the Spirit utilizes humans in the
process.127 This is often done through persuasion or appeals. Their main form of persuasion
utilizes arguments and evidences to show the rationality of believing in God — it is an appeal to
the nonbeliever’s mind. Jesus, too, utilizes argumentation and evidences (cf. Ac. 1:3; 17:31; Lk.
24:27). Whether or not one accepts the arguments, however, does not determine their
legitimacy.128 But, since the persuasiveness of an argument depends on the individual, arguments
should be made to use widely accepted notions.129 Regardless, many people do not need
arguments to come to the faith.130
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Perhaps the largest internal distinction in anthropology surrounds the controversy of facts
and their interpretations, involving human knowledge and the human condition. Evidentialists
uphold that the fall did not damage humanity’s ability to understand facts, whether religious or
not.131 Adam, indeed, still recognizes God’s voice after his sin (Gen 3:8-10). Certainly, humans
have sinful biases, but this does not remove their ability to overcome the biases, especially when
presented with overwhelming evidence.132 Classical apologists, on the contrary, usually hold that
worldview determines facts; thus, they must be persuaded to a theistic worldview first. Soft
classical approaches align more with the evidentialist’s stance. For Geisler, a hard classical
apologist, the historical evidences make no sense outside of a theistic worldview.133
A few assumptions appear to inundate these approaches. First, the primary goal of
apologetics is to demonstrate the rationality of Christian belief.134 Defending the faith, in these
approaches, means that the Christian worldview be shown as logical, reasonable, and most
plausible. Of course, this is usually not the only aim, as demonstrating Christianity to be true or
that one should commit their life to Christ are often secondary or tertiary goals; yet they are
subsequent to the primary aim. As noted earlier, the Christian faith is shown to be true through
demonstrating its rationality. The logical arguments and evidences are meant to show that the
faith is rational; believers, nonbelievers, and the general culture should see faith as an
intellectually plausible, or the most plausible, option. Traditional apologetics need not always
show the faith to be true entirely, unlike presuppositionalists, for showing Christianity as merely
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a reasonable option is enough.135 Second, the method focuses on humans as rational beings.
Humans are essentially a mind or consciousness; they are defined mainly by thought and rational
operations. This model tends to deny humans as essentially embodied — perhaps occasionally or
temporarily, but not essentially — and views the role of emotions or affections as largely
irrelevant, if not something to be overcome.136 Clearly, this model permeates their apologetic
methodology as the mind is primarily appealed to through reason, and the role of reason and
cognition in determining both truth and belief is viewed very positively. This will be more
apparent in the next section upon comparison since E/N methodologies strongly resist this model
for a more holistic view of a human person.

Experiential / Narratival Apologetics
Experiential and Narratival apologetics (E/N) represents an interesting counter to the prior
fastidious methodologies. The former methodological foci emphasize rationality and
presuppositions through detailed argument(s); E/N, in contrast, is usually pessimistic towards
these endeavors.137 Since this approach is more ill-defined and ambiguous than the others, it can
be hard to place proponents into this view confidently and uncritically. However, it will likely
include proponents such as Myron Penner, C. Stephen Evans, N.T. Wright, Alister McGrath, and
John Stackhouse. Although they are not necessarily contemporary, many E/N thinkers often refer
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to the ideas of Blaise Pascal or Søren Kierkegaard.138 Several other recent apologetic works may
share commonality, more or less, with this approach: “ad hoc apologetics” of George Lindbeck;
“postliberal apologetics” of Meredith Handspicker; “dialogical apologetics” of David Clark;
“postmodern apologetics” of Nancy Murphy; “person-centered apologetics” of J.S. Brent and
D.E. Chismar; “unapologetic apologetics” of William Placher; “narrative apologetics” of David
Clark; “holistic apologetics” of Irving Hexham, Stephen Rost, and John Morehead; and “crosscultural apologetics” of Benno van den Toren.139 Although E/N approaches offer more diversity
than within the former apologetic categories, they converge upon shared foci. Several focused
themes permeate these approaches: (1) lived experience, (2) narrative or story, (3) appeals to
“holistic” and unique persons, (4) limitations of human reason, (5) community, (6) pre-rational
factors of belief, (7) apologetic dialogue, (8) methods that appeal to postmodernism or a multicultural world, (9) critiques of traditional apologetic methods and epistemologies, and (10) the
aim of apologetics as conversion and maturation or edification.140
Reason itself as an arbiter of truth is questioned in E/N approaches. Thinking is not neutral
nor objective for them; all facts must be interpreted through subjective beings. Blaise Pascal
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famously wrote that “the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing,” and that it is “the
heart which perceives God and not the reason.”141 The “heart” for Pascal represents a person’s
immediate intuitions; before any thoughts, there are the first-principles known by the heart,
which all reason is dependent upon.142 Unlike fideism, this is not a complete dismissal of reason;
however, it recognizes the limitations of reason as influenced by other factors. Pascal continues:
“Anyone who chose to follow reason alone would have proved himself a fool… Reason never
wholly overcomes imagination, while the contrary is quite common.”143 Reason is subsumed by
the heart and passions — it cannot be the whole ground for truth; this explains how Pascal can
claim that uneducated and unintelligent people may be more certain of spiritual and existential
truths than many who are educated and intelligent.144 Reason helps make sense of the world and
revelation, but it is not the sole grounds for truth or the gospel.145 Pascal’s wager actually reveals
the inherent biases within a person: if it is wiser to believe in God, why not believe?146 Humans
are naturally biased either for or against God, and reason cannot decide the truth, so one should
be biased towards God.
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Humans are comprised of prejudices, emotions, will, and imagination — all which affect
reasoning. A holistic human is “a social, emotional, religious, and cultural entity, with certain
drives and living in a specific context.”147 These complex drives and contexts of a human shape
identity and decisions.148 For example, Kierkegaard claims that obedience to God is grounded on
passionate love, a desire that causes action; a zeal for propositions will not lead to such action.149
The identity and decision of the obedient Christian is formed through their desire and direction
of love towards God. Reason is situated within the unique commitments that shapes the
framework for how people think, act, and believe.150 There is no neutral starting point — reason
and truth are always caught up in a social context alongside assumptions, presuppositions,
practices, and vocabularies which influence them.151 In this way, modernistic understandings of
reason, and thus traditional apologetics, may actually be harmful to defense of the faith.152 For
example, apologetics may perpetuate systematic or ideological violence, since it can be
overcome by the “powers of the prevailing culture.”153 Whereas traditional apologists focus more
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on the content of argumentation, E/N apologists emphasize the way or style of apologetic
dialogue, for this reason.154
Truths ineluctably “come to us in story form and must be embraced and lived out in order to
be truly understood.”155 This epistemological model rejects reason as tantamount in seeking
truth. The truth is not a set of propositions or ideas to mentally ascend to; the faith (and thus
truth) must be lived and embodied.156 A comical metaphor may render this presumption more
comprehensible: Imagine a desperate and libidinous young man, pining for companionship,
craftily constructing his dating profile to fulfill his desires. In an attempt to be genuine, he
scrupulously writes out everything that can be said about himself. Given an infinite time frame,
he finally finishes the task. To his horror, he realizes there is still something missing about
himself — his existence. Even though all the facts about himself are written out and understood,
it is not truly him. Existence cannot be thought or conceived — it must be lived. Similarly, being
a Christian is much less about knowing the truth than becoming the truth; it is a way rather than a
position.157 Knowledge of the truth follows from being the truth.158 Thus, traditional arguments
or proofs for God are asinine — a fool’s endeavor.159 Instead, Christians should invite people to
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hear and embrace the gospel, and to experience Christianity. Proof of God is found within the
lived witness and testimony of the church, both individually and communally.160 The church is a
prophetic witness to their neighbor by means of self-giving love.161 Concisely, “the church
doesn’t have an apologetic; it is an apologetic.”162 “The final test of the Christian scheme,”
William Alston suggests, “comes from trying it out in one’s own life, testing the promises the
scheme tells us God has made, following the way enjoined on us by the Church and seeing
whether it leads to new life in the Spirit.”163
Unsurprisingly, these approaches are heavily critiqued by traditional apologists and
academics with a more modernist framework of reason. Perhaps this is why E/N proponents are
often mislabeled as fideists; it is not that they believe faith and reason are completely separate,
but they do certainly view the association through a different framework.164 This perception led
to the neglect of E/N approaches as possible apologetic methodologies by many. Even those who
do acknowledge them as distinct or viable methodologies often qualify their terminology: John
Warwick Montgomery labels this experiential approach as “non-apologetic apologetics”; James
K. A. Smith refers to this method as a type of “unapologetics”; Myron Penner, perhaps the most
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blunt with his aptly titled The End of Apologetics, asserts he is “against apologetics.”165 Penner’s
diction clarifies the idea: he wishes to completely redefine the apologetic task; he is against the
traditional way of doing apologetics.166 This critique resonates for many today, as this
“traditional” way is seen as reductionist and untenable; perhaps especially for pentecostals.167
Smith reflects on the early pentecostal community at the Azusa Street revival:
“their experience of meeting God in embodied worship led them to resist and reject the
rationalism of modernity in favour of an understanding that gave primacy to the
affections, to the ‘heart’. In other words, the philosophical anthropology embedded in
pentecostal faith and practice does not yield a ‘thinking thing,’ but rather an embodied
heart that ‘understands’ the world in ways that are irreducible to the categories and
propositions of cognitive ‘reason’… [pentecostal epistemology] does not constitute a
rejection of cognition or propositional truth; but it does situate and relativize that
particular mode of knowing.”168
Pentecostal spirituality espouses a pre-theoretical knowledge that affirms the whole person and
an affective and narrative epistemic practice.169 Pentecostalism and E/N approaches both
emphasize pre-rational knowledge, experience as necessary for truth, “holistic” human beings as
narrative and affective creatures, the importance of community for truth, and the Church and
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Christian as witness.170 Thus, a pentecostal apologetic strategy would likely follow along E/N
lines, such as employing invitation and testimony, with the purpose and aim for others to follow
Jesus and be transformed by the relationship and story.171 This type of approach precludes the
“professionalization” of apologetics: witness is for all, not simply an intellectual or academic
elite.172 Perhaps the similar positions on propositional truths, reason, and witness are what make
categorization, then, elusive for both E/N and pentecostalism.
There are both hard and soft E/N approaches. A hard E/N approach focuses solely on
experiential and narratival “defenses” of the faith, rejecting logical and historical arguments in
the process; whereas a soft approach would likely employ those arguments, but still have a
penchant for the experiential and narratival as the primary method.173 Myron Penner would lean
towards a hard approach, while N.T. Wright would be an exemplar of the soft approach.174 E/N
apologists with a hard approach are usually wrongly critiqued as fideists, and soft E/N apologists
typically may appear hard to distinguish or categorize at all — especially from cumulative case
apologetics. Interestingly, Alvin Plantinga may be considered a conglomeration of soft
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presuppositionalism and a soft E/N approach.175 Since the dissimilitude between apologetics and
evangelism becomes more ambiguous in E/N approaches, some proponents may not even be
commonly considered apologists. Yet, they offer a distinct apologetic approach.
An E/N anthropological and scriptural understanding inevitably differs from the prior
methods, albeit they share more in common with presuppositionalism. One of the fundamental
claims of this approach is that human beings are holistic and multi-dimensional creatures; this is
often reflected in their understanding of the imago Dei (cf. Gen 1:27).176 Some E/N see the
image of God as a type of narrative or imaginative template that makes sense of the world, since,
fundamentally, humans are narratival and thus affective creatures.177 A reductionist account of
humanity to primarily rational beings “obscure[s] our creation of God in our own image.”178 The
New Testament develops the idea of conversion and repentance as μετάνοια, i.e. a change of
mind (cf. Mk. 1:4; Lk. 3:3, 24:47); but this is not merely a change of beliefs or intellect — it is a
change in affections, desires, and will.179 The mind is first fundamentally reoriented, and then it
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continually matures and is transformed (cf. Phil. 1:16, 2:1-2, 5; Rom. 12:2).180 The
transformation and reorientation of one’s mind should not be taken lightly, as this is a significant
demand, and the apologist’s approach should honor this.181 Since conversion involves the
intellectual, moral, emotional, aesthetic, spiritual, physical, and relational realms, apologetic
method should reflect all of these areas. For Paul, salvation “depended on affectively and
imaginatively absorbing a story—and seeing [oneself] within that story.”182 Since the Spirit
alone converts (cf. 1 Cor. 3:5-7; Jn. 3:3-5), the role of humanity is simply to bear witness
through their living and proclamation of the gospel, and to aid others in moving toward full
conversion and maturity (which, of course, will not be complete until the eschaton).183
Persuasion, reason, and witness, in this way, can rightly work together and not be harmful, but
require a community of like-minded individuals.184 This approach also must be done in a personor audience-sensitive way.185 “I have become all things to all people,” Paul testifies, “so that by
all possible means I might save some” (1 Cor. 9:22 NIV).
A few assumptions differentiate E/N approaches. First, the primary goal of apologetics is to
demonstrate that one should commit their life to Jesus.186 Whether or not this is towards an initial
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conversion or a maturation, this is the preeminent aim for E/N approaches.187 Second, this
approach sees humans as primarily desiring or loving beings. Like presuppositionalism, E/N
emphasizes a person’s pre-rational presumptions that shape their world and interpretation.
However, E/N pushes this notion further, as beliefs and presuppositions are founded on what one
desires or loves.188 This amounts to an embodied, affective, and narrative anthropology. This is
why the goal is conversion. Truth must be embodied and to change one’s mind requires a
reorientation of desire, love, will, and affections. These factors determine beliefs and affects
reason.

Summary & Conclusion
This chapter began with an exploration of various taxonomies for apologetic methodologies. The
methods were then further organized, as appropriate, into categories that shared the same general
approach. From this list, three were selected for further analysis based mainly on recognition and
utility in contemporary settings: presuppositionalism, traditional apologetics, and
experiential/narratival apologetics. Each view provided a unique perspective on apologetic
approach and methodology. Presuppositionalism argues that the Christian God is a necessary
presupposition — the only way to make sense of the world. Traditional apologetics utilizes
arguments and evidences towards a rational case for the Christian God. Experiential/Narratival
apologetics emphasizes that truth is embodied and lived, and thus, their approach reflects witness
and a focus on experience and narrativity.
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Each approach’s view of humanity directly correlates to their method and aim of
apologetics. The anthropological model and chief task of apologetics separate these three
categories. Traditional apologetics, with more optimism towards the reliability of reason,
strategically focuses on humans as rational beings. Their primary aim is to defend Christianity’s
rationality. Presuppositionalism, highlighting the pre-rational beliefs of humans, views humans
as believing beings. Their primary aim is to show that Christian belief is true since it needs to be
presupposed for truth. Experiential/Narratival apologetics, which promotes a holistic picture of
humanity and truth as necessarily embodied, regards humans as desiring beings. Thus, their aim
is conversion — an invitation to follow Christ and live the truth. Although any generalizations of
apologetic approaches risk misunderstandings, the specific methods articulated in this chapter
reflect these anthropological models and goals primarily in practice. Certainly, traditional
apologists would like to show Christianity as true and for people to come to Christ. However,
their chief aim represented through their method reflects the goal of the rationality of
Christianity. Similarly, they may even personally view humans as more than simply rational
beings — yet their method(s) do not primarily reflect this. The next chapter will attempt to
develop an interdisciplinary “portrait” of a human to compare with the three models assumed by
these methods, and thus explore any implications from the research for apologetic method.

CHAPTER THREE
THE HUMAN PERSON: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PORTRAIT
Introduction
“What are human beings that you care for them,” David asks the Lord, “mere mortals that you
think of them” (Ps. 144:3 NIV)? Despite the thousands of years difference, this question is still
presently asked in a variety of ways. Many of the prevailing theological issues today are
anthropological, whether racism, evolution, ableism, gender — or apologetics. An inaccurate
perception of humanity may breed disaster. Improper anthropological perceptions have led to
oppression, exclusion, violence, value hierarchies, and countless other sins. A well-informed
anthropology produces and benefits an apologetic method, whereas a misinformed or reductive
anthropology negatively affects the health and effectiveness of apologetics.
This chapter aims to provide an anthropology informed by theology, the social sciences,
and neuroscience. specifically focusing on human origin, the human condition (and solution), the
mission and purpose of humanity, ontology and epistemology, and the end or destiny of
humanity for apologetic purposes.1 Therefore, many anthropological issues, such as human
freedom, racism, ableism, evolution, gender, and sexuality will not be directly engaged — even
if there may be indirect inferences.2 At the end of the chapter, the resulting implications for
apologetics will be outlined and contrasted to James K.A. Smith’s three anthropological models.

1

Although Christian anthropology is grounded in and filtered through Scripture and theology, the sciences can
supplant and nuance this information, as will be seen later in the chapter. These fields offer unique perspectives that
are often considered in discussions of anthropological issues.
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For a closer look at some of these issues, see Hans Schwarz, The Human Being: A Theological Anthropology
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2013); or Charles Sherlock, The Doctrine of Humanity (Downers
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Theological Anthropology
The challenge of constructing a theological anthropology is multifold. First, the task is inevitably
complex, since it interacts with soteriology, Christology, eschatology, hamartiology,
epistemology, and many other theological fields of study. Second, much of the task is already
shaped by the priority given to different anthropological questions and the assumptions usually
imported into the biblical text.3 For example, the ambiguity of the imago Dei in Genesis is
attributed a variety of qualities, such as reason, usually reflecting one’s own anthropological
assumptions.4 Third, which sources are given precedence is up for debate, usually through the
primeval history of Genesis, Pauline literature, and the person of Christ.5 Thus, the following
sections will attempt a tripartite approach to theological anthropology, consisting of the early
Genesis narratives, Christology, and Pauline literature for a more holistic and balanced account.
This anthropological study will focus on human origin, the human condition (and solution), the
mission and purpose of humanity, ontology and epistemology, and the end or destiny of
humanity — all relating to Smith’s three anthropological models and any implications for
apologetics. The story begins in Genesis.

Grover: Intervarsity Press, 1997); or Susan A. Ross, Anthropology: Seeking Light and Beauty (Collegeville:
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I. The Image of God: Eden & Afterward
The two creation narratives in Genesis ground a theological anthropology, answering questions
of human origin, condition, purpose, and destiny.6 The first humans are created by God in God’s
image and likeness (Gen 1:26–27). At the risk of stating the obvious, humans are created as
contingent, diverse, and transient beings.7 The Creator has formed his creation ex nihilo, i.e. out
of nothing, and creation is utterly dependent, or contingent, upon God (cf. Gen. 1:1; Heb. 11:3;
Rev. 4:11). Humans are finite, with a beginning and (earthly) end in a particular place and time
(cf. Acts 17:26). Knowledge and human judgments, then, are necessarily contingent on personal
circumstances.8 Diversity pervades the creation, and not only in biological sex. Each human is
made in the image of God, but this image is recognized and embodied in different ways (cf. Gen.
1:26–27).9 These characteristics are not defects since humans are created good (Gen 1:31).10
Over the centuries, various understandings have been attributed to the image of God that humans
bear, usually controversially argued in one of three ways: (1) as a quality, e.g. reason, love, or
language; (2) as a duty, e.g. propagation and dominion, or (3) as a relationship.11 Regardless, the
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Several scholars note two separate creation stories in Genesis: 1:1–2:4 and 2:4–2:25. Which story includes 2:4 is a
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Sandra L. Richter, The Epic of Eden: A Christian Entry into the Old Testament (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press,
2008), 93–95.
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the Human Person: A Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing, 2014), 265–270. As Oberdorfer describes, all these views can be heavily critiqued — and for good
reason. The biblical text is also rather ambiguous to an exact meaning. That is why many instead make the starting
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Hebrew word for “image” has a standard ancient Near Eastern meaning akin to “idol” which
entailed earthly representation of deities; in other words, humans are supposed to be
representatives of God on earth — whether that’s through qualities, duties, relationships, or
something different altogether.12 At the very least, the image of God is about connection to God
and a reflection of him.13
Humans are also created as necessarily embodied (Gen. 2:4–7). God “breathed life into
human bodies, bodies created by God, indicating God’s view of the body... it is good because
God formed it with God’s own hands” (cf. Gen. 2:7).14 Furthermore, both creation narratives
point to the relationality of humanity (cf. Gen 2:18–25). The first creation narrative portrays both
male and female as being created together (cf. Gen 1:27). In the second creation narrative, when
man is first created without woman, his life is neither good nor complete (cf. Gen 2:18) — not
until another is also created.15 Humans are made for fellowship. No human exists in isolation,
divorced from God, creation, or each other.16
The narrative then takes a tragic turn: Adam and Eve eat of the tree of the knowledge of
good and evil and disobey God (cf. Gen. 3:6). The serpent tempted Eve with a new vision: she
will not die, will be like God, and will know good and evil (cf. Gen. 3:4–5). Their sin is usually
perceived as human pride and a desire for self-sufficiency or autonomy — a desire to be like

place the New Testament use of the image of God, which provides a Christological, eschatological, and formational
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God.17 However, if Eve did not know of good and evil when she sinned, the implication is that
sin began as (and may still be) a misguided good or desire.18 Eve, for example, saw the serpent’s
vision (i.e. the fruit of the tree) — the misguided good — and found it “desirable” (Gen 3:6). The
tension between the desire to be loved and the desire to be self-sufficient is a common theme in
the biblical narratives.19 Although their sin prompts shame and hiding from God (cf. Gen 2:25;
3:8), God calls out (cf. Gen 3:9) and covers them with a sacrifice (cf. 3:21).20 Their sin results
not only in a reversal of blessings, but also in the relational effects of the Fall — to God,
creation, and others. They feel shame with each other and God, and the ground and creation
becomes cursed (cf. Gen 3:14–19). This is the first of many rebellions or “falls” — for after
Genesis 3 no human avoids sin; it is a continuing pattern throughout history.21
The creation narratives propose an answer to the question “why do I exist?” Humans were
created “to live in and attend to paradise” (Gen. 1:28–30; 2:8–17); this arguably includes many
types of labor and creative work today.22 God planned “a perfect world in which [humans] would
live eternally, stretching their cognitive and creative skills to the uttermost, building their
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civilization within the protective boundaries of their relationship with him.”23 Although sin and
misguided desire supposedly mess up God’s original intent for humanity, redemption history
reveals God’s “final” plan is leading humans to New Jerusalem — it is God’s original plan all
along (cf. Rev. 21–22).24 God is “making all things new” (cf. Rev. 21:5) — a (re)creation not ex
nihilo, but ex materia. The rest of Scripture addresses the sin problem.25 As Sandra Richter
illuminates, “God has been leading humanity back to Eden by means of a sequence of steps, a
series of rescues, a series of covenants.”26 This is the grand story of God and humanity. How will
humanity return to Eden? How will sin be dealt with? How can humanity once more reside in
God’s presence? Through Jesus Christ alone.

II. The Perfect Image of God: Christ(ology)
Christology often clarifies other areas of theology, and perhaps anthropology especially. Jesus
Christ is the true man (cf. Jn. 19–20), the second Adam (cf. 1 Cor. 15), the perfect image of God
(cf. 2. Cor 4:4; Col 1:15), and the quintessential exemplar for humanity (cf. Heb. 1–2).27 All
other humans reflect the image of God to the degree of their likeness to Christ (cf. Rom. 8:29; 1
Cor. 15:49).28 Christ is not just any model of faith (cf. Heb. 11); he reveals what it means to be
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truly human; he is not only fully human, but perfectly human (cf. Heb. 5:5–10).29 If this is true,
then embodiment and relationality should be affirmed as essential to humanity.30 This may be
particularly evident in the synoptic gospel’s holistic soteriology — a transformation of the
totality of a person.31 Consistently, healing is not merely spiritual or even mental, but also
physical and relational (cf. Matt. 8:1–4, 9:2–13, 27–31; Lk. 8:42–48). Jesus heals the body, but
also restores people to their family and community since they would often be considered
unclean, and further reveals the universality of salvation (cf. Mark 5:21–43).32 More so, Jesus’
resurrection reveals an embodied Jesus (cf. Lk. 21; Ac. 2:25-31, 10:40–42) and the description of
New Jerusalem is one embodied on earth (cf. Rev. 21–22). However, a theological anthropology
is not complete without acknowledging the Spirit who empowers him, the Father who sends him,
and his relation within the Trinity.33
The hypostatic union, i.e. Christ’s dual human and divine natures, explains the relation and
distinction between God and humanity. Maximus the Confessor, a seventh-century theologian,
engages the language of Logos and logoi to discuss this correlation. Ian McFarland recapitulates
his idea:
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“God, the Logos, seeks to share the divine goodness with that which is not God, and so
doing refracts the richness of the divine life through myriad nondivine forms, the logoi
of individual creatures, each of which displays some aspect of the undivided fullness of
humanity... Logos has a broad array of meanings. It can be translated ‘word,’ ‘speech,’
and ‘reason’... however, I suggest that ‘story’ is a particularly appropriate rendering.”34
The Creator (Logos) becomes creation (a logos among logoi) so that God may be known.35
Certainly, Jesus is different than other humans. Not only was he born a particular human with an
ethnicity, gender, culture, etc., but he was also sinless and God.36 Jesus is not different through
the lack of a human nature (logos), but rather through the way his humanity is realized (tropos).37
In Jesus’ humanity, he lived dependent upon the Father as Son, hence the logos of humanity
remains.38 Jesus is fully human. Yet, his humanity is lived “filially” — in a way concordant with
the Word’s way of being God.39 This explains how Jesus can be fully divine and fully human: he
shares every condition of humanness, yet lives in a way consistent to the Logos’ manner of
existence, thus he transcends “normal” humanness through genuinely finite action. Jesus’ story
perfectly reflects the eternal mutual love represented in the Trinity; similarly, each human’s own
story attests to and is subsumed and sustained by the Logos — the Story.40
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The hypostatic union reveals at least two major anthropological implications. First, the telos,
or ultimate end, of humanity is to “be aligned with its own natural logos but also for it to exist in
optimal relation with the Logos”; this is what it means to be fully human.41 In other words, the
ultimate goal of humanity is to actualize the Word’s loving dependence on the Father in one’s
own finite life. This is exactly what separates Jesus from the rest of humanity — Jesus fulfills
this end through the tropos of filial relation, i.e. utter dependence and love for the Father.42 Since
each logos expresses and reflects God uniquely in a finite form, the diversity of the logoi more
fully reflect the eternal Logos — at least to the degree that they act as they should.43 Second,
human self-emptying (kenosis) and self-transcending (ekstasis) can only be realized because of
one’s alignment with Jesus’ humanity as his sacramental Body.44 The Incarnation made this end,
i.e. transformation via kenosis and ekstasis, possible through unification with the incarnate
Logos. Rowan Williams further describes Maximus’ ekstasis as the proper telos of humanity:
“it is the condition in which the knowing finite subject goes beyond its given limits,
including the ‘natural’ limits of self-preservation: it is generated by erōs, [i.e.] the
magnetic drawing of finite beings towards the infinite. For Christ to live in the believer
is for the believer to be caught up into the self-abandoning love both of the Son for the
Father and of God for Creation... What God brings about in the finite is a movement of
‘desire’, erōs — that is, a moving beyond what the intellect can master and a growth in
love. But this growth in love manifests itself also as an overcoming of ‘the divisions
now prevailing in nature because of man’s self-love: the community of finite agents
becomes more and more solidly established in ‘justice’ as human beings recognize
more fully in one another their common nature as rational. Paradoxically, universal
rationality here means the universal realization of ‘ecstasy’ acting in other-directed
love for all in their diverse conditions, so that believers ‘[belong] not to themselves but
to those whom they love.’”45
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This divine way of living is the telos of humanity. As human desire for the infinite grows, the
more he/she will reflect divine filiation through kenosis and ekstasis. Augustine similarly
espouses that human willing follows desire.46 Hence, humans sin because of their inadequate
recognition of God’s perfect goodness and beauty; they cannot not sin unless their desires are
oriented to the good.47 Jesus, of course, perfectly sees and desires God’s goodness and beauty, so
he is without sin — and it is because of him through the Spirit that humans can achieve this.48
This is the telos that humanity anticipates, and which explains the lack of sin in glory. Jesus
alone has reached this telos; humanity’s reflection of God is commensurate to the degree their
desire is properly oriented. In the culmination of this desire, the image of God within a person is
fully realized and one’s life reflects the divine community.49 The divine became fully human, so
humans, too, can become fully human. Although Jesus’ physical body is no longer here, the
Body of Christ — the Church — mediates his presence here on earth.50 That God became fully
human, suffered and died on the cross, resurrected, and brings salvation is the heart of the gospel
— a message that Paul calls all people to participate in.
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III. The Present Image(s) of God: Paul & Participation
Paul’s writings further illuminate the anthropological condition, mission, and destiny —
specifically through his soteriology. All of humanity has “fallen short of the glory of God” and
thus are “under the power of sin,” “ungodly and unrighteous,” and have “darkened minds” (cf.
Rom. 1:18–3:23); humans do not live how they are intended to, and thus their destiny, or telos, is
also not what is intended. Sinful humanity needs a radical reorientation — nothing less than
salvation.51 For Paul, Jesus Christ provided a way of salvation for all people through his death
and resurrection (cf. Rom. 1:16) God’s mission on earth is to bring salvation to the world — the
whole cosmos, even (cf. Rom. 1:16; 8:18–25).52 However, this salvation is not received through
beliefs in a set of propositions or any type of intellectual assent; rather, for Paul it is through full
participation in the gospel, “a comprehensive transformation of conviction, character, and
communal affiliation” (cf. 2 Cor. 5:14–17).53 Michael Gorman emphasizes that participating in
Christ “is both to benefit from God’s mission of liberation and reconciliation and to bear witness
to this divine mission — thus furthering it — by becoming a faithful embodiment of it.”54
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these qualities, see 26–49.
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Paul calls people to become the gospel; being, doing, and telling the gospel.55 This
participation is a present condition, a mission, and a future end for humanity in Christ. The
Church through the Spirit, both individually and communally, presently participate in the divine
as they reflect the image of God on earth. Paul presents several examples of how this present
holiness occurs: through embodying faith, hope, and love (cf. 1 Thess. 1:3; 5:8, 23); through
peacemaking and reconciliation (cf. Eph. 4:3); through hope and patience in suffering (cf. Rom.
12:2); and through humility and gentleness (cf. Eph. 4:2; Rom. 12:16; Phil. 2:2–4). Succinctly,
believers “wear” Jesus (cf. Rom. 13:14; Eph. 6:10–22) and re-narrate his story through word and
deed.56 As they participate in the missio Dei and embody the imago Dei, viz. as they become
more Christ-like, they reverse the consequences of the first man, Adam (cf. Rom. 1–2).
This participation and transformation is not just temporal and ethical, it is eschatological and
ontological.57 The ultimate telos of humanity is the “freedom of the glory of the children of God”
(Rom. 8:21) and conformity to the Son (Rom. 8:29).58 All of this is solely possible because of
Christ through the Spirit who empowers believers to participate in and embody the gospel, thus
being a witness to the world (cf. 8:9–17).59 Although a shallow reading of Paul may see the body
as evil or unnecessary, Paul’s anthropology is more complex and counters both these
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reductionistic notions; embodiment is good when one’s desires are rightly oriented, since “those
who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires” (Gal. 5:24).60
This spirit-empowered witness through word and deed, or gospel embodiment, is a defense
(apologia) and confirmation of the faith (cf. Phil. 1:7).61 This apologia is often a response to the
suffering and persecution believers experience.62 Yet defense is not only reactionary but
proactive, involving peacemaking and loving one’s enemies (cf. Rom. 12:17–21).63 A similar
exhortation occurs in 1 Peter 3:13–17 (ESV),
“Now who is there to harm you if you are zealous for what is good? But even if you
should suffer for righteousness’ sake, you will be blessed. Have no fear of them, nor be
troubled, but in your hearts honor Christ the Lord as holy, always being prepared to
make a defense (apologia) to anyone who asks you for a reason (logos) for the hope
that is in you; yet do it with gentleness and respect, having a good conscience, so that,
when you are slandered, those who revile your good behavior in Christ may be put to
shame. For it is better to suffer for doing good, if that should be God’s will, than for
doing evil.”64
Although 1 Peter 3:15 is engaged in most apologetical works, it is often divorced from its wider
context.65 The purpose of 1 Peter is holiness in three forms: (1) personal holiness, (2) social
holiness, and (3) communal holiness.66 In this passage, the author focuses on doing good amidst
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the evil, suffering, and oppression, emphasizing how believers respond to their persecutors, with
the implication that their good behavior and obedience (or submission) will make the persecutors
question and ask about the hope they have.67 The defense is much more about orthopraxy, or
right action, than presenting a rational case against other belief systems, even if “reason” implies
a verbal defense as well.68 So for these authors, apologetics, the task of defending the faith, is to
bear witness to the gospel in word and deed. Of course, this witness may include rational
arguments or evidences, but it is not essentially that.
If the defense of the faith is witness in word and deed, then it ineluctably overlaps with
evangelism.69 Apologetics is inevitably evangelism in the sense that believers’ lives bear witness
in both word and deed. Defending the faith is a product of becoming the gospel; as they live
correctly, they bear witness and defend the faith. The only way a “defense” is not witness, is
when it does not participate in or reflect God — and if that’s the case — believers should not
engage in it. This obviously (re)defines the relationship between apologetics and evangelism in a
way discordant with some popular beliefs. This is especially true if evangelism is limited by
definition to the verbal proclamation of Jesus Christ’s death, burial, and resurrection.70 The most
common view, especially popular among traditional apologists, is that apologetics is a type of
“pre-evangelism” or reasoned argumentation separate from proclaiming the gospel.71 The
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rational arguments and evidences are meant to open up a person to hearing the gospel message,
clearing away intellectual “debris” of sorts. In this system, “evangelism sticks more to the
emotional than to the rational.”72 Yet this posits a reductionist framework of not only salvation,
but the gospel itself — at least according to Gorman’s understanding of Paul. Salvation is
conveyed (and embodied and practiced) through word and deed. Paul challenges the former
notion and (re)defines the idea of apologetics, although this does not necessarily reject the idea
of reasoned arguments and evidences within that framework. This revised view is consistent with
the E/N methodology and their primary aim in apologetics.
The way defenses are made matter for Paul. For example, Paul compares holiness amidst the
culture to waging war in 2 Corinthians 10:4–6 (ESV),
“For though we walk in the flesh, we are not waging war according to the flesh. For
the weapons of our warfare are not of the flesh but have divine power to destroy
strongholds. We destroy arguments (logismos) and every loft opinion raised against the
knowledge of God, and take every thought (noēma) captive to obey Christ, being ready
to punish every obedience, when your obedience is complete.”
The Roman military imagery contrasts the weapons of Christ against the weapons of the culture,
including “violent force, sophisticated philosophical logic that wins debates, [and] even displays
of ecstatic experiences designed to dazzle.”73 Rather, the Church’s loving witness takes every
mind (noēma) captive through the transformation of enemies into the children of God, thus saved
from their hardened and blinded noēma (cf. 2 Cor. 3:14; 4:4).74 Furthermore, Paul creatively
shapes his witness and testimony around his audience. For example, his verbal witness to the
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Jews (cf. Acts 2), Greeks (cf. Acts 17), and Romans (cf. Acts 24–26) all uniquely are formed
around each audience.75 This echoes of Paul’s proclamation, “Yes, I try to find common ground
with everyone, doing everything I can to save some” (1 Cor. 9:22 NLT). Witness, in word and
deed, should be creative.

The Sciences
In recent history, multiple disciplines confirm — or at least reveal intimations of — persons as
desirers or lovers, including neuroscience, psychology, sociology, and behavioral economics.
This is mainly revealed by the research in two ways: (1) a rejection of the person-as-thinker
model, and (2) evidence of persons as more holistic than the other models assert. So, while this
may not necessarily confirm the entire person-as-desirer model, the research corroborates their
central claims. Humans are affective, intuitive, narrative, relational, and embodied — these are
central and essential characteristics to what it means to be human. Humans are also certainly
thinking beings, but only among other attributes, and it is not as central as some would maintain.
As the research will show, a person’s “reasoning” is often simply a post-hoc justification of
something more subconscious. A human person is much more complex and holistic than many
models consider.
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I. The Social Sciences
Jonathan Haidt, a social psychologist, rejects a Platonic anthropology where reason is not only
central to the human being, but the master of passions or desires. Rather, he insists that reason is
(mostly) servant to the passions.76 He employs the metaphor of a rider and an elephant to
highlight the difference between two types of cognition: reasoning (controlled processes) and
intuition (automatic processes, including emotion).77 The rider, i.e. reasoning, sees into the future
to make better decisions, learns new skills, and is a spokesperson for the elephant.78 However,
the elephant does whatever it pleases — the rider does not guide it — the rider mainly creates
post hoc justifications or explanations for the elephant’s movements. In other words, intuitions
deeply guide humans, and most reasoning is simply an after-the-fact justification for what is
already intuitively known or felt.79 A person’s judgments and reasoning can often persuade
others’ intuition, especially in the context of a friendly relationship or affective narrative, since
social influence substantially affects humans.80 Of course, one’s own intuitions or judgments
may be changed via the rider through private reflection and reasoned judgment, but this is rarely
the case.81 Haidt lists six key research findings that together reinforce this metaphor: (1) affective
primacy, viz. intuition/emotion are processed fast and are more powerful than thinking; (2) social
and political judgments depend heavily on fast intuitive “flashes”; (3) moral judgments are
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affected by taste, smell, and other bodily states; (4) psychopaths reason but lack many emotions,
and their moral judgments are deficient; (5) conversely, babies feel but lack reasoning, yet have
the beginnings of moral judgments; and (6) moral judgments are correlated to affective reactions
in the brain.82 Together these findings reveal that most (moral) judgments are the result of
intuition and emotion, rather than reasoning.
The field of Behavioral Economics similarly contests humans as merely “rational” beings.
Traditional economic theory assumes humans always optimize, i.e. make the most rational (or
internally consistent) decision, and reason without bias.83 This fictitious optimizing creature is
referred to as an “Econ.” However, unlike Econs, humans are often found misbehaving:
decisions are oftentimes too difficult to solve, beliefs are biased, and supposedly irrelevant
factors greatly influence decisions and beliefs.84 Real humans rarely believe or choose rationally,
but they are not irrational either — a rational-agent model of humanity is simply not compatible
with the current research.85 Thus, the field of Behavioral Economics emerged — shifting the
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object of economic theory from Econs to real people who err, in order to improve accuracy of
predictions. Humans are biased or misbehave in several ways: loss aversion, a bias towards
avoiding losses rather than making profits; framing, a bias from how information is presented;
anchoring, a bias towards recently encountered information; confirmation bias, seeking evidence
for pre-existing beliefs; the halo effect, when feelings towards unrelated data impacts belief or
judgment; hindsight bias, a post-hoc belief that an outcome was predicted or considered very
likely; and the endowment effect, where a possessed item is valued more than the same nonpossessed object.86 Daniel Kahneman describes two cognitive “systems.” System 1 is automatic
and creates quick judgments involving intuitions, impressions, and emotions; while it is the
origin of many biases and wrongful judgments, most of the time System 1 is correct.87 System 2
is slow, deliberate, and detailed — often “associated with the subjective experiences of agency,
choice, and concentration.”88 Although System 2 often improves performance and takes over
when System 1 is in trouble, it usually rationalizes and forms beliefs from the decisions in
System 1 and is also prone to error due to its own limits.89 Thus, in order to persuade a person,
an appeal to System 1 is usually most effective.90 Kahneman’s dual-system thinking shares much
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commonality with Jonathan Haidt’s metaphor of the elephant and the rider, with similar
conclusions.91
But are important decisions, like religious belief, really prone to post hoc rationalizations?
On top of the prior research, a brief examination of atheists (and nonbelievers in general) may
point to a similar conclusion. Psychologist Paul Vitz found that a majority of history’s most
famous and outspoken atheists had absent or dysfunctional fathers between the ages of three and
five, e.g. Nietzsche, Hume, Russell, Sartre, Camus, Freud, and Wells.92 (Interestingly, Derek was
two years old when our father left.) Conversely, the opposite was true with famous theists.
Although he rejects this correlation will be true in all cases, as he gives examples of, he reveals a
trend. He concludes that many atheists likely reject God for subconscious reasons, and not from
reason or evidence primarily.93 Demographic research conducted by the Barna Group
interestingly supplants Vitz’ familial theme: the outreach effort most likely to appeal to Skeptics
(i.e. self-proclaimed atheists and agnostics) is learning “that the church has older adults who
provide life lessons and advice to younger adults”; whereas this ranked much lower for the nonSkeptic nonbeliever.94 While any direct causation is contestable, the correlation at least points to
the likelihood of pre-rational factors of disbelief in some cases. Other research from the Barna
Group studied non-Christians’ negative perceptions of the faith. Most negative perceptions result
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from personal relationships and church experiences, and at least one-fifth of non-Christians —
and one-third for 16–29-year-olds — note negative experiences with a church or Christian that
affected their view of Jesus negatively.95 As Kinnaman soberly states, “what people think about
Christians reflects personal stories.”96 These experiences lead many away not only from other
Christians, but from the faith. A rejection of Christianity, then, is usually more than simply a
denial by reason alone, if at all, and may likely be a post hoc judgment based on pre-rational
factors. Thomas Nagel, another well-known atheist, succinctly articulates this post hoc
justification: “It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God, and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my
belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe
to be like that.”97
Sociologist Christian Smith claims that pre-rational beliefs, narratives, and relationships are
central to what it means to be human. Human lives and knowledge are inevitably founded upon
assumptions and beliefs that cannot be empirically verified nor proved with certainty.98 Neither
are these assumptions and beliefs universal — at least in the sense of being present everywhere
— which is empirically untrue.99 The abortion debate largely exemplifies this: Should a woman
have freedom to dispose of the baby/mass of tissue? At what point does someone become a
living human? The answers to these questions are unverifiable since any “evidence,” whether for
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or against a stance, is understood through one’s basic beliefs and assumptions.100 As Smith notes,
“the ability of data to prove or disprove a theory is problematic when the data themselves are
always and profoundly theory-laden.”101 The assumptions and beliefs of individuals, societies,
and institutions have substantial consequences — and often become so ingrained that they are
invisible.102 Humankind and culture cannot be properly understood without this understanding.
Not only are humans believing creatures, but they are narrative creatures who both share and are
made by stories that orient their lives and convey meaning.103 People hold a variety of both
personal and “big picture” narratives, which may or may not be consistent with each other.104
There are also metanarratives, i.e. an all-encompassing story about purpose, origin, nature, the
destiny of humanity, and moral order which governs and plots all other stories and narratives.105
Sociologist Roy Baumeister’s research shows that in order for the human quest for meaning to be
satisfied, people need answers to four questions: (1) Identity: Who am I? (2) Value: Do I Matter?
(3) Purpose: Why am I here? (4) Agency: Can I make a difference?106 Narratives, of all sizes,
bring meaning to life and answer these questions to some degree. As Smith argues, people
“cannot live without stories, big stories finally, to tell us what is real and significant and to know
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who we are, where we are, what we are doing, and why.”107 Although narratives shape beliefs,
reason, and interpretation of evidence, people can still be changed and persuaded — in fact it
happens all the time. Smith’s anthropology (and epistemology) challenges people to be aware of
their stories and why debates and discussions can be so difficult; the challenge for people today
is to figure out how to discuss rival narratives, persuade the other, and live together.108 While this
research critiques the human-as-thinker model, it points towards at least a human-as-believer
model, if not also the beginnings of a human-as-desirer model.109 Despite the ambiguity, the
following neuroscience research evidently supports the human-as-desirer model.

II. Neuroscience
Neuroscience supports the claims that humans are holistic — not only are humans thinking
beings, but more centrally (or essentially) are emotional, embodied, narrative, and
relational/social beings. The various research also supports a concept of the human person as
anti- or post-Cartesian. Antonio Damasio’s profound neuroscience research on the prefrontal
cortex illuminates the role of emotion in cognition. Patients with damage to their prefrontal
cortex often become emotionally detached with a severe personality change.110 One patient could

107

Smith, Moral, Believing Animals, 151.

108

Smith, 89–94.

109

Although Christian Smith verbatim states that “at bottom, we humans are all really believers,” his approach has
intimations of a humans-as-desirers model, evidenced through the focus on narrative, bodily practices and rituals,
and interdependence on relationships. Regardless, it poses a clear rejection of “the Enlightenment ideas of
foundationalist knowledge, universal reason, and the autonomously choosing individual.” See Smith, 150–155.
110

Ian G. Barbour, “Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, Human Nature” in Neuroscience and the Person:
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 249–280, 257. Also see Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion,
Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: C.P. Putnam, 1994).

72

understand the appropriate emotions he should have, yet could not feel them, allowing emotion
to not forcefully affect his reasoning. In a person-as-thinker model, this should have allowed for
better, and more rational, decisions and judgments — yet the opposite occurred. These patients
often were unable to make decisions or made foolish ones in their own personal lives — even
though they retained their IQ and moral understanding of right and wrong. The conclusion is
simple: emotions, including desires and intuitions, are necessary for proper rational decisions.
Joseph LeDoux, similarly, sees emotions as central to humanity since they are critical for
survival, necessarily interconnected to most parts of the brain, and complex — since the brain
has several different “emotion” systems for different purposes.111
Humans are also essentially social beings. Marc Jeannerod’s research highlights the intrinsic
social and communicative nature of humans, and also sheds insights into the philosophical
problem of other minds. First, Jeannerod reveals that humans naturally have the ability to
recognize others’ intentions (“mirror neurons”) because the system for detecting intentions,
beliefs, or actions of others is the same system used for the self. “We can know what people
think (or believe, or intend),” Jeannerod argues, “because we are able internally to simulate the
states of their minds.”112 Social communication involves shared simultaneous (though not
identical) mental states between individuals in order for mutual understanding. Second, the brain
cannot always recognize the origin of intent — having a neural representation of an intention and
attributing it to the self are two different processes that aren’t necessarily linked.113 For example,
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one experiment told subjects to recognize whether hand movements were theirs or the
experimenters after following movement instructions. In two easy cases, the subjects were
almost always correct: (1) when the experimenter’s hand did not follow the correct instructions,
and (2) when they were actually viewing their hand. However, when the experimenter’s hand
followed the instructions, thirty percent of the time normal subjects misattributed the movements
to themselves; for Schizophrenics, who tend to incorporate external events into their own
experience, the percent raised to eighty. Together, these two insights reveal how the brain is
naturally equipped for social action, and also falsifies “the Cartesian dictum that one knows
one’s own mind (intentions) directly and indubitably.”114 Leslie Brothers’ research, mainly
around the role of the amygdala in social function, similarly asserts that human brains are
equipped for social participation.115 More so, both congenitally blind (i.e. patients born blind)
and deafferentiated patients (i.e. those who have lost vision, and touch and bodily awareness
from the neck down) gesture in conversations, hinting that part of being human is essentially the
relationships with others, further giving evidence for human intersubjectivity.116
Humans are also essentially embodied. The research of both Marc Jeannerod and Michael
Arbib explore the action-oriented nature of human cognition. For example, Jeannerod cites
studies that show how mentally imagining or simulating action leads to direct activation of the
motor system; in other words, thinking of an action resembles intentionally executing an
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action.117 Thus, he shares neurophysiological evidence of the moral dictum “to intend is to
act.”118 Arbib asserts that perception is an action-oriented restructuring of the world rather than a
passive reception of data, and that several types of mental events are dependent on various
physiological processes.119 Arbib’s research supports “a pragmatic as opposed to a contemplative
approach to epistemology.”120 Shaun Gallagher also cites evidence for this connection. First,
neonates imitate facial expressions of others as soon as a few minutes after birth — long before
language or abstract thought develops. Not only does this reveal an essential relational aspect of
humanity, but also that even before newborns attain a theory of the mind, they already have an
embodied understanding of other people.121 Thus, human developmental research rejects people
as disembedded from other minds and minds in general as disembodied.122
The diversity of neuroscientists also points to humans as essentially narrative creatures. This is
particularly evident when it comes to episodic memory. Lesions in the hippocampus can severely
impact episodic memory — the “narrative” memory that gives context to experiences and a
continued sense of identity.123 Alzheimer’s patients, or any patients with severe loss of memory,
reveal the devastating effects of not being able to construct new narratives.124 Without being able
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to form memory narrativally, every event would be new, thus inhibiting identity (re)formation
and experiencing the present.125 Similarly, Damasio also notes that construction of a narrative,
including personal memories and intentions, is essential for any type of continuity of identity and
consciousness.126 This narrative is not simply a recollection of past events, however; it is actively
reconstructed and influenced by re-interpreted past events, future goals and plans, and narratives
in culture, religion, and so on.127 Narratives, both personal and communal, are vital to what it
means to be human, survive, and have an identity.

Summary & Conclusion
This interdisciplinary approach to anthropology paints a more holistic picture of humanity than
either of the person-as-thinker or person-as-believer models portray. Theological anthropology
hints at a person-as-desirer model through the explanation of sin and the human condition as
misguided desire, the mission/purpose of humanity as participating in the gospel through creative
witness in word and deed, salvation as seen as including more than just mental or spiritual
aspects, and how the ultimate telos of humanity is achieved through perfectly reorienting desire
and love. The social sciences and neuroscience support the notion of humans as essentially
affective, communal/relational, narrative, and embodied, alongside believing and thinking.

alive from the years he can recall — who is usually shocked to see he has aged fifty-some years overnight), or have
a clear representation of the self. Most evidently evidenced by his (frequent) freak outs when he realized he was an
old man and not nineteen years old. See Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat (New York:
Touchstone, 1998), 23–41.
125

Of course, most patients only have partial memory loss, and thus have varying degrees of these symptoms.
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Barbour, “Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, Human Nature,” 249–280, 257. Also see Damasio, Descartes’
Error.
127

Barbour, 258.
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Reasoning is never neutral, but necessarily affected by pre-rational factors of belief that reason
tends to justify post hoc. This anthropological “portrait” points to three apologetic implications
that should be considered alongside the larger work of E/N proponents: (1) apologetics is (and
should be) about more than simply logical and rational arguments, (2) apologetics should take a
creative approach, and (3) apologetics is the task of the Church, not just individuals.

CHAPTER FOUR
APOLOGETIC REFLECTIONS: PERSUASION, CREATIVITY, COMMUNITY
Introduction
In Douglas Wilson’s allegory Persuasions, Wilson describes the Road that runs in two
directions: eastward with a gradual incline that leads to the City, and westward towards the
Abyss.1 Many were headed down the wrong path towards the Abyss, but it was not always
evident since it winds through various canyons. The Master of the City displayed signposts
warning travelers of the dangers and instructed his servants to try to persuade the travelers in the
reverse direction. Those quite skilled at the endeavor learned to answer each traveler according
to their own objections and personal situations. Of course, this is the situation apologists (and all
Christians) find themselves in. How can we best lead them to the city?
Different anthropological models lead to different answers. As the prior chapter concludes,
the person-as-desirer model fits best with the interdisciplinary anthropological research. The
resulting three apologetic implications can be succinctly rewritten in three dichotomies: (1)
persuasion over argumentation, (2) creativity over rigidity, and (3) community over
individuality.2 If apologetics is more than simply logical and rational argumentation, then it
involves persuasion. If apologetics should be creative, it resists overly rigid approaches. If
apologetics is the task of the Church, and humans are social beings, then it involves community,
not just individuals. Each of these dichotomies should be understood in that the latter is

1

Douglas Wilson, Persuasions: A Dream of Reason Meeting Unbelief (Moscow, ID: Canon Press, 1997), 7.

2

Wilson’s allegory illuminates the three dichotomies: the task of the servants (i.e. the Church) is to convince (or
persuade) others contextually (viz. creatively) to go to the City.

77

78

subsumed by the former. For example, apologetics as persuasion does not omit logical and
rational argumentation but reveals it as one means of persuasion among many.
Although the person-as-desirer model fits best, all three of the major apologetic methods are
valuable for apologetics. For example, hard E/N methodologies tend to omit logical and rational
argumentation altogether — yet the anthropological research shows this type of reasoning is still
sometimes effectual, just not as influential as the former models suppose. So, there is a place for
much of the work of traditional apologists. Similarly, each anthropological model ended in
different, yet important, apologetic tasks. Defense of the faith, according to the previous chapter,
can include showing the faith to be rational, showing Christian belief to be true, and witnessing
to others so they will follow Christ. However, the former two tasks are subsumed by the latter —
and not always necessary. In other words, defense of the faith is always witnessing so that others
may follow Christ, and sometimes that includes explicitly showing the Christian faith to be
rational and/or true. The apologetic task, then, can be accomplished through a variety of means
of persuasion, yet is context-dependent and fulfilled in light of the larger Church community.
The rest of the chapter outlines and proposes an eclectic and holistic apologetic approach
influenced by anthropological research in terms of persuasion, creativity, and community.3

3

In a sense, this approach may be considered an extreme soft E/N approach since it not only allows for the other
methods and means, but is based on a person-as-desirer anthropological model. The critique and revision of method
is not aimed primarily at traditional or presuppositional methods, but against hard approaches and faulty or
inaccurate anthropological models.
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Persuasion over Argumentation: Attack the Elephant
If apologetics is (or should be) characterized by more than logical and rational argumentation,
then a more accurate term is persuasion.4 Following Jonathan Haidt’s analogy in the previous
chapter, each person is moved by their elephant and the rider tends to make post hoc
rationalizations for it. In order to persuade people, the apologist should primarily appeal to, or
“attack,” the elephant. Apologetics is usually viewed as pre-evangelism, i.e. a clearing of the
intellectual debris that prevent people from coming to Christ. However, there are many other
types of “debris” that stymie people from the faith, such as painful personal experiences. The
debris is often difficult to recognize, yet it drives the elephant that the apologist wants to impact.
How can apologists attack the elephant? As the next section will show, creativity can lead to
several unique strategies, but nine particular means (or modes) of persuasion are especially
relevant to the apologist based on the previous chapter’s research. The first three means of
persuasion are popularized by Aristotle: logos, ethos, and pathos.5 The following three modes,
i.e. kairos, mythos, and topos, are sometimes referenced alongside Aristotle’s triad and are
especially relevant for effective persuasion.6 Lastly, a specifically Christian approach reveals

4

Benno van den Toren agrees with the terminology since persuasion is complex, varied, and includes emotional and
moral components. Technically, one could argue that argumentation can include those components as well;
however, this is mainly opposing logical (or rational) argumentation as the only (or main) source of persuasion. See
Toren, Christian Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 178.
5

See Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, trans. H.C. Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 2004), esp. 16–17.
Although Aristotle popularized these means of persuasion, common usage today tends to slightly drift from his
views. So, the following articulations of each mode are not necessarily Aristotelian despite being drawn from his
concepts.
6

See “Kairos” and “Commonplace” in Jay Heinrichs, Thank You for Arguing: What Aristotle, Lincoln, and Homer
Simpson Can Teach Us About the Art of Persuasion, 4th ed (New York: Broadway Books, 2020), 419–423. The
previous chapter also gives credence for persuasion through story (mythos), relevance (topos), and timing or
appropriateness (kairos).
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tropos, typos, and theos as appropriate means of persuasion for the apologist.7 The nine modes
may overlap and interact with each other, but they each offer a distinct “tool” for the apologist to
reflect on. Together these modes shape an appropriate apologetic approach that recognizes the
holistic nature of each person. The rest of this section will explore the nine means of persuasion
in the apologetic process.
The first mode is logos, persuasion by means of logic and coherency.8 The apologist, in this
mode, seeks to establish the faith as coherent, rational, logical, and/or true. This can be
accomplished in many ways: rational or logical arguments for theism or the Christian God,
explanation of the Christian faith, or answers to objections or “defeaters” to Christianity, among
others. A traditional view of apologetics tends to view this as the sole (or primary) mean of
persuasion.9 Although the addition of logos may appear inconsistent given the former appeals
against the primacy of rationalistic thinking, this mode is nonetheless essential. There are many
people who genuinely view the Christian faith as irrational, illogical, and incoherent — whether
or not that is the sole reason for disbelief. Logos, by itself, rarely causes people to change their
views.10 This mode is most effective when among other means of persuasion.

7

The previous chapter notes the importance of the way arguments are made (tropos), gospel embodiment (typos),
and the role of God in persuasion (theos).
8

The Greek λόγος can be translated as a “word,” “speech,” “account,” or “reason.” See Maurice A. Robinson and
Mark A. House, Analytical Lexicon of New Testament Greek: Revised and Updated (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson
Publishers, 2012), 223.
9

This is explored in-depth in chapter two.

10

Evidence for this was explored in chapter three, especially through the research on post hoc justification. Haidt’s
research revealed that people are more likely to be persuaded, for example, if from a close friend they trust (ethos)
or a narrative (mythos). See Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 55–57, 79–91.
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The second mode is ethos, persuasion by means of character and authority.11 The apologist,
in this mode, seeks to establish their credentials. Why should a person trust the apologist? Why
do his/her thoughts matter at all? This mode seeks to answer these questions. People will often
look to the character, authority, and trustworthiness of the person persuading in order to “verify”
their claims. The failure of this area results in diminished impact and influence in persuasion.12
For example, very few today look to Adolf Hitler for moral advice — simply because he is not
trustworthy in that area. Even if he had something of worth to say, it would quickly be
overshadowed by the fact that he is not a person who one should be or want to be persuaded by.
Similarly, the Church is often a hindrance to people in their faith journey, whether deserved or
not.13 Christians, and by extension Christianity, are often viewed negatively, labeled in America
as archaic, anti-scientific, immoral (especially regarding sexuality), judgmental, politically
conservative, hypocritical, insensitive, and so on.14 The apologist should be aware of what a
person or community assumes of them, so they can work towards building credibility where
necessary. For example, an apologist combating the notion of Christianity as anti-scientific may
appeal to their authority as a scientist. There are several other ways this credibility can be built as
well: living a holy lifestyle above reproach, being lovingly involved in the life of the person or

11

The Greek ἦθος and ἔθος can be translated as a “habit” or “custom.” This root extends to ἠθικός which means
“character.” See Robinson and House, Analytical Lexicon of New Testament Greek, 101, 106.
12

A recent example of this is the controversy surrounding Ravi Zacharias International Ministries (RZIM). Dr. Max
Baker-Hytch, a RZIM apologist, sent a letter to the leaders of the ministry explaining that they have “lost trust
‘internally and externally’ because of its handling of recent scandals involving its founder.” The tattered reputation
of both the founder and the ministry has limited their influence as of late. See Julie Roys, “RZIM Apologist Sends
Stunning Letter: Says Ministry Has Lost Trust & Needs to Make ‘Meaningful Reparations’”, last modified
December 12, 2020. https://julieroys.com/rzim-apologist-letter-lost-trust-reparations/.
13

This was notably shown in the previous chapter, especially through the demographic research that personal
experiences with Christians/church often led to negative perceptions of the faith.
14

Many of these themes are explored and corroborated by the Barna Group. See Kinnaman, unChristian, esp. 28–
30.
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community, meeting people’s practical needs, or sharing of one’s own personal faith experiences
that lead to perceived credibility, among others.15 In most cases, a personal relationship with a
person or community proves most fruitful if the apologist is recognized as trustworthy.16
The third mode is pathos, persuasion by means of emotions and values.17 The apologist, in
this mode, seeks to appeal to emotions and values and remove any experiential roadblocks to the
faith. This is perhaps most foreign to traditional apologists where emotion is contrasted with
rationality.18 If an idea doesn’t feel right emotionally or intuitively, it will often be rejected
before being seriously (or rationally) considered.19 The ability to capture the emotions and values
of an audience can prompt more openness and reception, shift moods and perceptions, and lead
to an emotional commitment.20 This can be accomplished through diction, tone, analogies,
humor, surprise, compelling images, storytelling, worship, prayer, sympathy, and a plethora of
other ways.21 The idea is to point to personal experiences, feelings, and values for
persuasiveness. However, many people have experiential “debris” that prevents them from
coming to the faith. Perhaps the most “debris” comes from a person’s (or community’s) painful

15

This is reminiscent of the Apostle Paul’s words: “The only letter of recommendation we need is you yourselves.
Your lives are a letter written in our hearts; everyone can read it and recognize our good work among you.” (2 Cor.
3:2 NLT).
16

Haidt’s research emphasized that people are more likely to be persuaded if from a close friend they trust. See
Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 55–57, 79–91. Similarly, another study showed that the people most resistant and
antagonistic to the faith often joined the church due to the “persistence and long-term commitment of a Christian
toward them” (99). See Rainer, The Unchurched Next Door, 99–100.
17

The Greek πάθος can be translated as “experience,” “feeling,” or “passion.” See Robinson and House, Analytical
Lexicon of New Testament Greek, 259.
18

See Craig, Reasonable Faith, 20–21.

19

All the examples and research in the prior chapter on post hoc justifications support this claim.

20

Heinrichs, Thank You for Arguing, 416.

21

A great example of this is Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech. For more specific examples, see
Heinrichs, Thank You for Arguing.
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experiences. If a person were ostracized from their church due to their sexual orientation, why
would they want to follow Christ? If an oppressed community’s abuse were justified through
Christianity, why would they want to be a Christian? Deep, often undetectable, emotional pain
affects people’s view of Christianity, whether directly or indirectly related to Christianity and the
Church.22 If and when appropriate (kairos), the apologist can gently and respectfully try to
address the pain and hurt, specifically after they have a positive relationship and the apologist is
seen as trustworthy (ethos).23 Alongside the appeals above, addressing these experiential
roadblocks can allow for a more serious consideration of Christianity.
The fourth mode is kairos, persuasion by means of timing and appropriateness.24 The
apologist, in this mode, seeks to selectively choose when to apply other means of persuasion.
Certainly, there is an improper time and place for persuasive speech and argumentation. The
Westboro Baptist Church, in a grotesque example of this, picketed a funeral of a homosexual
teen who committed suicide while holding up signs that read “God hates fags.”25 There is
wisdom in knowing when and how to present information. This echoes Jesus’ prompt to “be
shrewd as serpents, and innocent as doves” (Matt. 10:6 ESV). Improper application and
timeliness of persuasion methods reinforces held beliefs and hinders consideration of the

22

On top of the demographic research from the previous chapter, another study shows that the people most resistant
and antagonistic to the faith usually have intense emotional stories surrounding their dismissal, whether directly or
indirectly. See Rainer, The Unchurched Next Door, 97–98.
23

The apologist should be careful and patient. If not handled cautiously, this may have the opposite effect. Healing
or re-framing experiential pain is usually not an easy or short process and may never even occur this side of
paradise. More than not, this may simply mean listening or being a presence.
24

The Greek καιρός can be translated as “fitting season,” “time,” or “opportunity.” See Robinson and House,
Analytical Lexicon of New Testament Greek, 187.
25

The Westboro Baptist Church is wrong in more ways than just their timing, but this method is clearly ineffective
for persuasion of the family.
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presented view.26 For example, in a formal debate at a university, logos should be the central and
primary means of persuasion, whereas the overuse of pathos or ethos may be viewed as
fallacious.27 Conversely, in an everyday conversation with a friend or child, over-reliance on
logos is usually not necessary; sharing stories or testimonies (mythos) may be a better option.
The fifth mode is mythos, persuasion by means of narrative and testimony.28 The apologist,
in this mode, seeks to affirm, defend, and explain the faith through stories. This mode can be
accomplished in several ways: fiction stories, allegories, myths, metaphors, parables, anecdotes,
personal testimonies, stories of others’ experiences, and inviting people to re-frame their own
story, among others. The editors of Futurist magazine once stated that the most valuable workers
in the twenty-first century would be storytellers. It’s quite easy now to see why: humans are
essentially narrative creatures, we make and are made by stories, they are fundamental to how
we understand ourselves and the world around us.29 Similarly, the Christian faith was passed
down and understood through stories. As Alister McGrath asserts, “we can not ‘demythologize’
Christianity, in that an irreducible narrative serves as both its heart and its backbone. Narrative
acts as both the medium and the message in Christian apologetics.”30 Christians, then, have a
unique place in culture, they have the ultimate story – not to mention a breadth of smaller stories
– in their arsenal. Although apologists such as C.S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, Fyodor
Dostoyevsky, and John Bunyan provide great examples of mythos, Jesus of Nazareth is actually

26

Toren, Christian Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 184.

27

In this type of setting, arguments from emotion and authority are fallacious as they alone do not lead to truth, as
persuasive as it may be. Alongside logos, however, they may make the argument even more persuasive.
28

The Greek μῦθος can be translated as “idle tale,” “fable,” or “story.” See Robinson and House, Analytical Lexicon
of New Testament Greek, 240.
29

This is largely supported by the research in the former chapter.

30

McGrath, Narrative Apologetics, 15.
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one of the most prolific storytellers of the faith.31 Stories and parables are persuasive as they
often have a way of circumventing more direct forms of communication; instead of abruptly
stating an idea or proposition, a narrative entices the reader to engage and explore the topic with
much greater nuance and attention, which explains how they are highly effective in changing
ideas and affecting behaviors. Mythos also includes other uses, such as illustrating a point,
suggesting solutions to a problem, planting ideas, bypassing resistance, and reframing or
redefining problems.32 Even though stories have historically been closely aligned with
apologetics, traditional apologetics often tends to dismiss narrative as a proper mode, likely due
to the lingering influence of Enlightenment rationalism on evangelicalism and the preference for
propositional revelation over the narrative genre.33
The sixth mode is topos, persuasion by means of theme and relevance.34 The apologist, in
this mode, seeks to show the faith as relevant and build a bridge from peoples’ lives to the
gospel. Aristotle originally referred to topos as an audience’s common opinion, the place where
any argument should begin.35 Topos, in literature, refers to a common theme that authors re-work
to fit an audience.36 Together these more or less describe the idea: an apologetic method should
be relevant to the audience. Both for clarity and effectiveness. This can be accomplished in

31

For an excellent resource on mythos in Christian apologetics, see McGrath, Narrative Apologetics.

32

Timothy Clinton and George Ohlschlager, Competent Christian Counseling, Volume One: Foundations and
Practice of Compassionate Soul Care (Colorado Springs: WaterBrook Press, 2002), 376.
33

For the effect of rationalism on narratives and evangelicalism, see Bebbington, “Evangelical Christianity and
Modernism”; and McGrath, Narrative Apologetics, 12–15.
34

The Greek τόπος can be translated as “a place” or “opportunity.” See Robinson and House, Analytical Lexicon of
New Testament Greek, 343.
35
36

See “commonplace” in Heinrichs, Thank You for Arguing, 419.

For a biblical example of how a topos is used, see James R. McConnell Jr., The topos of Divine Testimony in
Luke-Acts (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2014). Also see Terence Y. Mullins, “Topos as a New Testament Form,”
JBL 99, no. 4 (December 1980): 541–547.
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multiple ways: using a common theme, story, or metaphor; explaining a concept in a way a
person can understand; contextualizing the gospel message to the audience; utilizing means of
persuasion that are most suitable to the person; and addressing the questions and needs a person
finds relevant, among others. The failure of this mode often results in dismissal of the faith (and
a poor missiology) since it is either incomprehensible or insignificant.37 A defense should be
built from common ground (viz. common notions) between the apologist and the audience.38
Inevitably, then, the approach will look different depending on the person or group.
The seventh mode is tropos, persuasion by means of way and manner.39 The apologist, in
this mode, seeks to persuade in a way concordant with Christ. As the Pauline literature
emphasized in the previous chapter, the way an argument or appeal is made greatly matters. Any
apologetic approach that humiliates, dehumanizes, coerces, or leads to violence is misguided.40
Glen Scorgie explains this unloving manner of defending the faith:
“If we offend someone by our aggressive tone, we are likely to say, like the raspy old
mobster Don Corleone in the classic Godfather movies, after unleashing violence and
murder on his enemies, ‘It’s not personal; it’s just business’... [It is] a hard-nosed, inyour-face determination to dismantle the positions of unbelievers, expose their illogical

37

This is evident when extended to the global scene. For example, in twentieth century Africa, the main theological
questions raised relate to identity: how the belief of their ancestors and what it means to be African relates to the
Christian God and what it means to be Christian. Traditional apologetic methods often fail to answer the apologetic
questions of Contemporary Africa. Traditional approaches seem awkward and out of place. In many ways, this is
simultaneously happening even in the Western world, specifically in postmodern settings. See Toren, Christian
Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 3–4.
38

The prior chapter revealed this was the strategy of Paul. For further arguments on why common ground is
necessary, and why the critiques of thinkers such as Barth and Van Til are flawed or irrelevant, see Toren, Christian
Apologetics as Cross-Cultural Dialogue, 190–195.
39

The Greek τρόπος can be translated as “manner,” “way,” or “manner of life.” See Robinson and House, Analytical
Lexicon of New Testament Greek, 350.
40

Glen Scorgie shares a personal story where apologetics led to this outcome, see Glen G. Scorgie, “Confrontational
Apologetics versus Grace-Filled Persuasion,” Perichoresis 10, no. 1 (2012): 23–39, 23–25.
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or untenable nature, and ensure that truth triumphs. It is relatively indifferent to who
gets run over or coerced—who gets shamed or humiliated—in the process.”41
The how, not just the what, of apologetics should be carefully considered. The above reveals a
possibility of when “winning an argument” becomes the ultimate apologetic goal instead of
people following and becoming more like Christ. All apologetic methods and appeals should be
loving and emulate the fruit of the Spirit (cf. Gal. 5:22-23, 1 Cor. 13:1-7) — especially in
gentleness and kindness (cf. 1 Pet. 3:15; 2 Tim. 2:23-24). Speaking truth is not enough, it must
be done in love (Eph. 4:15). Apologists should persuade in a manner that reflects God, the
ultimate model of truth and love. Thomas Aquinas exemplifies this approach through his manner
of discussing opposing ideas: fully understanding the others’ point of view, listening
respectfully, abstaining from deceit in argumentation, refraining from jargon, and seeking clarity
and charity.42
The eighth mode is typos, persuasion by means of imitation and embodiment.43 The
apologist, in this mode, seeks to defend the faith through embodying the gospel. The totality of a
person’s life may be the best defense of the faith. Sadly, the opposite is true as well: failing to
embody the gospel often pushes people away from the faith. As Gandhi once stated, “I would
suggest first of all that all of you Christians, missionaries and all begin to live more like Jesus
Christ.”44 Even though he appreciated and respected the teaching of Christ, he was disturbed by

41

Scorgie, 25–27.

42

This is Thomas Aquinas’s spirit of disputatio, which alongside his specific method of argumentation, comprised
his method of disputation. Together these reflect the idea of truth and love. See Terry Muck, Christianity
Encountering World Religions: The Practice of Mission in the Twenty-first Century (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2009), 118–124.
43

The Greek τύπος can be translated as “type,” “image,” or “model.” See Robinson and House, Analytical Lexicon
of New Testament Greek, 351.
44

See E. Stanley Jones, The Christ of the Indian Road (New York: Abingdon Press, 1925).
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the actions of Christians. The Barna Group studied churchgoers to see if their attitudes and
actions were more Christlike or pharisaical, and the results are sobering.45 Over half of the selfdescribed Christians were both pharisaical in attitude and action; only fourteen percent were
Christlike in both attitude and action.46 The sad reality, especially evidenced through the
attitudes towards Christianity in the previous chapter, is that people are pushed farther away
from Christ from failure to imitate Christ. Imitating Christ’s love is a powerful means of
persuasion that may overcome several different types of barriers. In several of the biblical
passages from the last chapter, this was the general idea of a Christian defense: living in such a
way, in word and deed, that people are drawn to the faith. If anything, this is a call to holiness —
a holiness only made possible through God.
The ninth mode is theos, persuasion by means of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.47 This
mode emphasizes the role of God in persuasion. Christians would be amiss to believe it is solely
themselves who are at work in the conversion and persuasion process. As Jesus announced, “No
one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him” (Jn. 6:44 ESV). John Stackhouse
Jr. describes the (in)effectiveness of human persuasion in conversion,
“[Conversion] either in terms of fundamental redirection or in terms of full maturity
cannot be accomplished by our own powers of persuasion... Therefore our human
responsibility and opportunity is twofold. First, it is to bear witness, to demonstrate in
our living and to articulate in our speaking the good news of new life under God’s

45

Pharisaical attitudes included items such as “I believe we should stand against those who are opposed to Christian
values” and “People who follow God’s rules are better than those who do not”; whereas Christlike attitudes included
items such as “I see God-given value in every person, regardless of their past or present condition” and “I feel
compassion for people who are not following God and doing immoral things”. For further information, see Barna,
Churchless, 178–179.
46

The remaining results reveal 21% were Christlike in attitude but pharisaical in action and 14% were pharisaical in
attitude and Christlike in action.
47

The Greek θεός is translated as “God.” See Robinson and House, Analytical Lexicon of New Testament Greek,
174.
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reign... Second, we are to offer all we can to help each other in moving toward the goal
of full conversion, the goal of full maturity and everlasting shalom.”48
Human persuasion and witness remain important, but God is the ultimate persuader. Long before
an apologist arrives, God was already at work in persuasion. As the Body of Christ mediates
Jesus’ presence on earth through the Spirit (typos), Christians are empowered to witness and
defense. Yet God continuously draws people in, even without Christian presence. Ravi
Zacharias, for example, explains how many people in the Middle East are still coming to Christ
through dreams and visions despite the threat of death.49 An encounter with Christ is often all
that is needed for a person to be ultimately persuaded (cf. Jn. 1:43-50; Ac. 9:1-30).
Regardless of the breadth of persuasive tools at their disposal, apologetic methodologies
tend to focus on only a select few modes. This presents two problems: (1) the utilized modes
may not match the appropriate needs or roadblocks of a person or community, and (2) a failure to
utilize a mode may actually lead to the opposite of the intended outcome. The apologist able to
recognize the need for and utilize the appropriate mean(s) of persuasion, alongside God, will be
the most effective in attacking the elephant. However, even then there is no guarantee of
persuasion. Even when Jesus walked on Earth not all people were persuaded. Neither is there a
“perfect” approach. As the next section reveals, defending the faith is an art rather than a
science.

48
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Stackhouse Jr., Humble Apologetics, 81–83.

For testimonies of this, see Tom Doyle and Greg Webster, Dreams and Visions: Is Jesus Awakening the Muslim
World? (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2012).
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Creativity over Rigidity: Foxes are the Future
The Ancient Greek Poet Archilochus once said, "a fox knows many things, but a hedgehog one
important thing." Over the years, this proverb has been utilized to differentiate people into foxes
who craftily formulate various ideas into several strategies versus the unwavering hedgehogs
who embrace a single idea/strategy and yield it masterfully.50 Stated differently, hedgehogs are
rigid while foxes are creative. Creativity is “the tendency to generate or recognize ideas,
alternatives, or possibilities that may be useful in solving problems, communicating with others,
and entertaining ourselves and others.”51 On the contrary, rigidity resists adopting and changing
to the circumstances. When applied to the field of apologetics, the fox and hedgehog can
represent soft and hard apologists, respectively. Like the fox, soft apologists are eclectic and
open to various methods; they are creative. Creativity, in this context, involves drawing and
selecting from a wide array of apologetic strategies for specific audiences. Since persuasiveness
is subjective to each individual, the application of apologetic arguments and strategies should be
context-dependent and eclectic. Although apologists are often trained and practice as hedgehogs,
the complex world is in desperate need of foxes. Even if individual apologists specialize in a
certain method, strategy, or means of persuasion like the hedgehog, they should imitate the
creative fox by adjusting their approach to their audience. If apologetics is about creative
persuasion, then the defense of the faith should be very contextualized.
This is not to say the specialized research and work of “hedgehogs” are bad — in fact, they
are very needed. However, when the theory of apologetics is applied and practiced, a variety of
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methods are often useful and perhaps necessary.52 All three apologetic methodologies offer
useful strategies in different situations, whether it be through logical arguments or sharing of
stories. An effective apologetic approach should also share the aims of each apologetic method:
demonstrating the rationality of Christian belief, that Christian belief is true, and that one ought
to commit their life to Jesus. To match the context, apologists should adopt various parts of each
apologetic method as they see fit. However, this should not lead to an uncritical amalgamation of
the various views by forcing isolated and contradictory ideas into a larger system. Rather, they
should be prepared to “attack” each locus of humanity the views uphold: person as thinker,
believer, desirer; the head, the heart, and the gut. In any given circumstance, the apologist may
need to recognize where a person’s resistance or “debris” is located. The debris could be
intellectual, emotional, or instinctual. Most likely, a mixture is present. The creative apologist
can choose a strategy which matches the context and “debris”.
If apologetics is fundamentally about witnessing to others, and not solely about logical
argumentation, then the apologist may take on a variety of forms or roles. At times, the apologist
may look like a counselor, bringing healing while inquiring about the deeper roots of one’s belief
and behavior; or friend, caring for and walking alongside another in their faith journey; or
storyteller and performer, living out their faith life and telling stories – of their own life, of
others’ lives, and of parables or great fiction stories; or coach, pushing for action instead of
apathy or passivity; or teacher and debater, bringing clarity and coherency to systems while
pointing out inconsistencies or deficiencies in others. Since apologetics is about people, and
people are multifaceted, a proper apologetic approach, too, should be multifaceted.
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Overly rigid approaches are often ineffective at persuading a person and are even in danger
of pushing people further away. For example, imagine a woman who suffered from paternal
abuse as a child, and thus holds a subconscious distaste towards the “Father God” in Christianity.
While talking to an apologist who tries to debate her lack of belief, the apologist offers several
logical and rational arguments for the faith waiting for her to concede intellectually. Even if all
the evidence the apologist shares leads to the likely conclusion of Christianity, the woman’s
painful past is not dealt with, and she is perhaps worse off as she now associates Christians as
forceful, controlling, and argumentative like her father. In another example, imagine a man who
is critically searching for reasons to believe the faith is rational and logical, yet when he asks a
Christian about their reasons for belief, they simply offer up their personal testimony and
observance of miraculous healing services. Although these are not necessarily bad reasons, the
man is left with the impression that Christians are blindly following their faith without rational
evidence for it. If apologists lack the humility to believe that their method is not perfect in all (or
most) situations, then their approach may yield unintended and harmful consequences —
regardless of if the method sometimes works. For this reason, apologists who can draw from
several strategies and wisely choose a fitting one are more likely to yield positive results in the
practice of apologetics. Of course, every person will have their own strengths and weaknesses
when it comes to creative persuasion, which becomes beneficial when apologetics is viewed as
the role of the Church, and not solely the individual.

Community over Individuality: It Takes a Village (of Geese)
Geese fly farther together. When they fly in their iconic v-shape formation, the leader creates lift
for the birds behind, and in return the geese behind will honk to motivate the leader, even
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switching out leaders often to prevent fatigue. Even in the case where one bird falls ill and moves
behind the pack, at least two other birds will fall back to support the one fallen behind. Similarly,
African proverbial wisdom — in an acute critique against western individualism — avows that
“it takes a village to raise a child.”53 The combined wisdom from the example of geese and the
African proverb describes the importance of community and collaboration for growth and
effectiveness. Together, these two summarize, more or less, the importance of community in
apologetics: people are meant to be and grow within community, and the apologetic endeavor
becomes wholly more effective through collaboration. Even though community is regarded as
valuable, oftentimes the communal aspect is lost or disparaged in practice, especially, as will be
argued below, at the expense of apologetics. As with all the dichotomies in this chapter, the latter
is subsumed by the former; individuality is re-situated, but not neglected, within a framework of
community.
As implicated from the previous chapter, apologetics is the task of the Church. Even though
the Church includes both communities and persons, emphasis is primarily given to individuals in
apologetic approaches. Most of the apologetic literature highlights individualistic methods, viz.
persona contra persona, where the method is for an individual conversing with another
individual, or at the very least an individual to a passive audience, such as through debate or
narrative means. Although these hold much value, they neglect the rich possibilities of a
community-oriented approach. The counter-emphasis on community here is not to degrade
individualistic approaches — in fact they are essential — but rather to re-situate them into a
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larger framework; instead of apologetics being the task of several separate individuals, rather, it
is the task of a community of interconnected persons. In order to explain the difference,
individuals and persons will be differentiated.
Individualism, here, refers to the theory of a person as a self-contained entity, a project that
attempts to reduce a person into what they are solely in themselves.54 Most apologetic training
emphasizes the individual, this self-contained entity. The unspoken goal of this training,
thoroughly exaggerated, is often to become a type of omniscient conduit of perfect reason or
persuasion for the faith; the perfect debater or communicator, so to speak. However, the
individualism project is doomed to fail, at least according to the research in the previous chapter.
A person is not a self-contained entity. There is no person without other persons. A person is
both a social and narratival being that cannot be reduced to what is essentially “themself.” What
is a person without their relationships or memories with others? If these were suddenly forgotten,
would you still be you? The obvious answer is the negative. There is no individual, a person
outside of community or other persons. To use a trinitarian analogy, you cannot reduce the Holy
Spirit to “itself” without the divine communion with the Father and the Son; heresy aside, the
Holy Spirit would cease to be the Holy Spirit. So, too, with humans.
So what of all this, then? How does this relate to apologetics? In two ways:
anthropologically, the person being witnessed to is full of social and narratival connections that
must be taken into account, same as the apologist; pragmatically, the work of apologetics is most
effectively done within community through collaboration. The individualism model neglects
these insights, it essentially views the task of apologetics as done by separate individuals. In
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other words, it is as if there are several geese flying separately, only loosely connected by flying
in the same sky and occasionally pairing up. A community-oriented model, which refines and
reframes the former, views the task of apologetics as done by a community of several
interconnected persons. The whole formation is based on community and collaboration, like
geese. It may be appropriate, then, to speak of an “apologetic community,” which is essentially
the Body of Christ, the Church. Everyone participates in this approach — regardless of
education, (dis)ability, class, and so on — everyone is a witness to and defender of the faith in
their own way. As there are many churches making up the Church, so are there many smaller
apologetic communities. Many may find this distinction to be splitting hairs, a small and
insignificant nuance, yet the consequences can be drastic. At the very least, the efficacy of the
apologetic task is threatened. When the apologetic community is realized, the fruit of
collaboration reaps many benefits. Like geese, the apologetic community can go further
together.
The most obvious benefit of community is a plurality of approaches and strengths. The
previous section on creativity noted how the apologist’s role can take a variety of forms, such as
teacher, friend, or storyteller, and although not every apologist will be gifted in all of these areas,
an apologetic community allows others to “fill in the gaps” or to cover each other’s weaknesses.
Personally, I have met many Christians who shy away from apologetics due to feelings of
inadequacy; mainly as a response to traditional apologetics, where a certain intelligence and/or
education to reason for the faith seems like the primary task.55 The same can likewise apply to
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E/N methods when communication skills are lacking. The separate personalities within the
apologetic community is a strength, here, rather than a hindrance. The method(s) most persuasive
for a person are far more likely to be covered in community; whereas an individual apologist
leaves open many gaps. More so, as people are (re)introduced to the faith, they often require
more than one encounter with people before being truly persuaded. An apologetic community is
more likely to lead to multiple encounters.
Similarly, an apologetic community will also reach a wider and more diverse audience.
Obviously a single individual cannot be everywhere, know everything, do everything, and be
everything needed for every person, despite how often some try; a community, however, gets
much closer to those goals. When fatigue sets in, others in the community can take over. There is
no dependence upon a single leader or small group. The whole is bigger than the sum of its parts.
An apologetic community can pool resources, knowledge, and connections to tackle bigger and
more diverse projects than what individuals can usually do, which tends to result in a greater
impact. Whether the “debris” keeping people from the faith is intellectual, physical, emotional,
environmental, or so on, a community is more apt to respond to it. Unfortunately, stories of
people feeling “left behind” from Christian communities are very common. If a “community” is
simply a loose patchwork of individuals in close proximity, rather than a unified and
collaborating community, they will likely be unable to recognize and respond to people’s needs
in several instances. When each individual has only their own goals and mission, many will
predictably fall behind without assistance.
Another downside of individualistic apologetic approaches is that frequently a particular
strand of Christian theological tradition is put forward and defended, not simply the “essentials”
of the faith. To be fair, an individual apologist can hardly circumvent this inclination, anyways.
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This may lead some to believe that debatable matters are necessary to follow Christ, as many
non-Christians (and Christians alike) are oblivious to the vast history and breadth of Christianity.
This may be especially pronounced in traditions with a tight theological framework, where
removal of one aspect leads the rest to fall apart, which is likely why particulars are especially
defended in the first place. Yet, there are many who cannot accept certain practices or views of
God, but would feel comfortable within a different tradition or theological strand; of course, they
may never learn of that if they only converse with a single individual. An apologetic community
can stymie the preoccupation with unessential doctrines and practices, specific traditions or
denominations, and even individual leaders or thinkers so that people do not reject the whole
instead of a part. Although some may see diversity of opinion as a negative, a diverse community
can actually lead towards greater clarity and nearness to truth; perhaps even the humility and
openness needed for genuine dialogue.
The significance of community-oriented apologetics is more than just an attestation to
teamwork — even though the effects of collaboration should never be underestimated.
Apologetics is the task of the Church, the Apologetic Community. The call to witness to and
defend the faith is the call for all persons, and since we are created as social beings, we
necessarily fulfill this call in community. To be human is to be in community, to have relations,
and stories, and memories, and if our apologetic strategies fail to account for this, our efficacy
will inevitably be reduced. Rather than solely relying upon individualistic methods, such as oneon-one conversations or an individual writing a persuasive book for the faith, a revised
apologetic framework should incorporate those methods within a model of community and
collaboration. This revised framework should challenge the focus on the singular; not only
“What can I do?” but “What can we do?”; not only “What can we each do separately?” but
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“What can we each do together?”. Individualistic apologetic approaches are vital, but they
cannot supplant the ontology of the Church as the Apologetic Community.

Summary & Conclusion
If apologetic methods are necessarily affected by their anthropological assumptions (and an
exploration of contemporary apologetic methods seems to suggest so), and if a person-as-desirer
model proves the most accurate (and the current interdisciplinary research certainly serves as
corroboration), then an effective and well-informed apologetic method will develop from the
implications of such a model. Apart from many of the insights already discussed from soft E/N
methodologies, three particular implications of the research are valuable for the development of
an apologetic method: persuasion over argumentation, creativity over rigidity, and community
over individuality. The conclusion of human persons as holistic suggests persuasion through
multiple means for effectiveness in defending the faith. Creativity, as the art of persuasion,
indicates the polyvalent role of the apologist. The task of defending the faith is not fulfilled by a
few select individuals but is consummated through and practiced as the Apologetic Community.
Although this chapter may be criticized for its focus on theory and method rather than more
specific and “practical” guides or how-tos, it accurately portrays the essence of such a method.
There is no one-size-fits all approach. Every person’s needs are different and require a unique
strategy. Each community will need to work out in their time and place how to best respond to
the call to defend the faith.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
This thesis has attempted to derive insights on apologetic method from research on what it means
to be human. I have sought to accomplish this in three steps. The first main chapter explored
contemporary apologetic methods. Around fifteen unique approaches were found through
comparing several taxonomies of apologetic methods. Although some were not considered for
further consideration due the scope of this thesis, the rest were placed into three categories based
on their similarities: Traditional Apologetics, Presuppositionalism, and Experiential/Narratival
Apologetics. The approaches of each were analyzed and their underlying assumptions of
humanity explored. These reflected James K.A. Smith’s taxonomy of anthropological models
and each correlated to a different primary apologetic aim: persons as thinkers, with the aim of
demonstrating the rationality of the faith; persons as believers, with the aim of showing
Christianity to be true; and persons as desirers, showing that one ought to commit their life to
Christ.
The following chapter examined interdisciplinary anthropological research for
comparison to the assumptions of each method. Theological anthropology — explored mainly
through the early Genesis narratives, Christology, and Pauline literature — revealed intimations
of the person-as-desirer model through the human condition, nature, purpose and mission,
salvation, and telos, among others. The sciences corroborated similar claims. The sociological,
psychological, and economical research thoroughly rejected a person-as-thinker model, and
revealed humans as at least believers, if not desirers. However, any ambiguity was dismissed
promptly due to the neuroscientific research that substantially supported a person-as-desirer
model: humans are necessarily narrative, affective, embodied, and social creatures. Apart from
99

100

insights already gleaned from E/N methodologies, three implications of the research for
apologetics were provided: (1) apologetics is (and should be) about more than simply logical and
rational arguments, (2) apologetics should take a creative approach, and (3) apologetics is the
task of the Church, not just individuals.
The implications from the previous chapter were rewritten in three dichotomies:
persuasion over argumentation, creativity over rigidity, and community over individuality.
Rather than focusing on only logical or rational arguments or evidences, the first section
discussed nine unique modes of persuasion for defending the faith: (1) logos, persuasion by
means of logic and coherency; (2) ethos, persuasion by means of character and authority; (3)
pathos, persuasion by means of emotions and values; (4) kairos, persuasion by means of timing
and appropriateness; (5) mythos, persuasion by means of narrative and testimony; (6) topos,
persuasion by means of theme and relevance; (7) tropos, persuasion by means of way and
manner; (8) typos, persuasion by means of imitation and embodiment; and (9) theos, persuasion
by means of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The following section on creativity emphasized the
eclectic nature of a well-informed apologetic method. The final section on community described
the importance of collaboration in apologetics, the role of community in each person’s life, and
developed the idea of an Apologetic Community.
The arrival to an apologetic method such as this may seem foreign, if not foolish, to
many, as it is very different than the concept of apologetics they have been handed. Perhaps this
is the point all along: apologetics has become a branch that needs to be pruned, made less
exclusive, individualistic, and overly cognitive, and more in line with how we were made and
how we are. Although each apologetic method could filter Derek’s story through their own lens
and explanations, in my experience — not to mention from the research in this thesis — I find
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this method is not only more effective in a pragmatic sense, but more in line with who people
essentially are and the kind of work we are called to as Christians — the Apologetic Community.
A few future lines of inquiry come to mind. First, an examination of a wider scope of
apologetic methodologies, such as historical or unpopular methods, may prove fruitful. Although
this would not change the outcome of the interdisciplinary research, it may help further nuance
the assumed anthropological models and track the history of development and shifts in
methodology and/or anthropology. Second, since pentecostalism is my received and chosen
tradition, this research could lead to further development and articulation of a distinctly
pentecostal apologetic method, with a special emphasis on pneumatology that was noticeably
absent in this paper. Lastly, little attention was given to a philosophy of language, which can not
only reveal parts of our humanity, but also provide insight into methods of communication.1

1

Although omitted due to space restraints, I found the work of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy especially valuable. His
insight on language or speech as related to community, narrative, affections, embodiment, and logic reflects much of
the heart of this work. Furthermore, his discussion of grammatical health and “diseases” of speech are timely for the
current climate of apologetic dialogue today. See Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, The Origin of Speech (Eugene: Wipf
and Stock Publishers, 1981), esp. 10–18, 38–72, 128–129.
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